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Abstract

This dissertation considers the problem of an intruder attempting to traverse a defender’s territory in which the defender locates and employs disparate sets of resources
to lower the probability of a successful intrusion. This research is conducted in the
form of three related research components: the first component examines the problem
in which the defender subdivides their territory into spatial stages and knows the plan
of intrusion. The second component studies a similar problem but is unaware of the
intrusion plan, introduces more defensive assets capable of lowering the probability
of a successful intrusion, and examines alternative solution methods for instances of
the problem. The third component further studies the underlying problem by using a
game-theoretic framework in which the attacker observes defender location decisions
prior to formulating an appropriate intrusion plan.
Security systems must effectively detect and intercept would-be intruders with
an efficient use of limited assets. For the organization of security operations, these
operations are often decomposed into spatially distinct stages to organize efforts and
facilitate localized management of assets. Given two respective sets of detection resources and interdiction resources, each having different types of resources with heterogeneous capabilities, this research addresses the problem of locating and allocating
them over a sequence of spatially-defined stages to effectively detect and intercept an
intruder. We set forth a mixed-integer nonlinear mathematical programming model
– and seven alternative variants – to address the underlying problem using a leading
commercial solver for global optimization. Empirical testing evaluates and compares
the effect of alternative model variants on the efficacy and efficiency of the solver to
identify global optimal solutions over multiple synthetic instances for a set of scenarios
iv

corresponding to specific problem feature settings. Subsequently, a designed experiment examines the impact of selected problem features on the ability of the leading
commercial solver to address increasingly-sized instances of the underlying problem,
portending its utility for larger applications. The testing results reveal that the number of types of detection and interdiction resources significantly affect the relative
optimality gap achieved, and the number of defender stages is a significant predictor for the required computational effort required when solving a scenario instance.
Ultimately, the superlative model variant is identified via two phases of empirical
testing and performs well with regard to both solution quality (measured by relative
optimality gap achieved) and required computational effort over various sizes of scenarios, identifying solutions within 0.005% of the global optimum for 77.2% of the
900 instances tested, and while only terminating due to the imposed time limit of 900
seconds for 56.8% of the same instances. The research concludes with a description
of the extensions to which these results will be applied.
Effectively detecting and interdicting intruders within a defender’s territory is a
common security problem. Often, the defender’s territory is decomposed into spatially distinct stages for organizational convenience. Given an intruder attempting
to traverse a spatially-decomposed region via multiple possible paths, this research
aims to effectively and cost-efficiently identify a defensive strategy that locates sets
of detection resources and interdiction resources, each of which has different types
of resources that vary by cost and capability. We formulate and validate a mixedinteger nonlinear programming model to solve the underlying problem first using a
leading commercial solver (BARON) and then via two genetic algorithms (RWGA and
NSGA-II). Computational testing first identifies instance size limitations for identifying a global optimal solution via BARON, motivating the use of metaheuristics.
Subsequent testing demonstrates the superior performance of RWGA and NSGA-II
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on 10 randomly generated instances for each of 20 various instance sizes. For each 20
of these instance sizes, both RWGA and NSGA-II produce higher-quality and more
non-dominated solutions than BARON while using much less computational effort.
Subsequent testing of only RWGA and NSGA-II over a designed set of test instances
identifies NSGA-II as the recommended technique to solve larger-sized instances of
the underlying problem.
A relevant, applied problem in the location analysis literature is the effective location and allocation of resources to detect and interdict intruders traversing a defended
region. For selected applications, a defender’s resources are designed to detect and/or
interdict intruders on specific parts (or stages) of the respective paths. Within this
context, this research is motivated by the problem of effectively defending a set of
population centers against attack by a limited number of intercontinental ballistic
missiles (i.e., intruders) via the location of ballistic missile defense resources to detect
and interdict them over a range of launch-to-target missile paths and their respective, spatio-temporally defined stages of flight. Assumed is an adversary capability to
observe the defensive asset locations and respond with an ICBM targeting strategy
that maximizes the expected damage of an attack. The research presents a bilevel
programming model for the corresponding Stackelberg game and, via transformations
and reformulations, identifies a single-objective mixed-integer nonlinear program that
can be addressed with any of several commercially available solvers. Upon proving
the convexity of the resulting formulation to assure reported solutions are globally
optimal, comparative testing identifies the commercial solver scip as preferred for
solving instances of the underlying problem. Empirical testing via a designed experiment examines which scenario features of the underlying problem are most significant
for predicting the required computational effort to solve problem instances, yielding
insight into the practical nature of this research to address instances of increasing

vi

size.
In aggregate, this dissertation examines a sequence of models of increasing complexity and fidelity to address the underlying problem of locating defensive assets
within an enterprise designed to detect and interdict intruders. Selected assumptions
vary across the sequence of models, differing in the manner of addressing intruder
detection, the number of intruders, and the rational behavior of an adversary. For
each such model, the research proposes and empirically examines an appropriate,
accompanying solution methodologies, assessing their efficacy and efficiency for realistic, synthetically-generated instances. Although the research culminates with the
proposition of a game theoretic model, arguably the most compelling approach to the
problem, aspects of each phase of the dissertation research offer new contributions to
the corpus of modeling and solution techniques to benefit this application and other
asset location problems.
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ENTERPRISE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR INTRUDER DETECTION
AND INTERCEPTION

I. Introduction

1.1

Motivation
The advent of the ballistic missile in World War II came with the need for bal-

listic missile defense (BMD) (Missile Defense Agency, 2013). Resulting from the
evolution of missile technology over the ensuing decades, contemporary versions of
these weapons can strike a precise location on a different side of the planet, and they
can carry nuclear warheads as well (i.e., intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs).
Currently, the United States BMD enterprise consists of various, strategically-placed
sensors to detect, identify, and track missile threats. The sensors’ role is a fundamental component of successful BMD; their destruction would be a critical loss. Working
in concert with the sensors are interceptor launchers deployed to destroy incoming
ballistic missiles; each launcher and its interceptors have certain associated costs and
likelihoods of successful intercept, given positive identification and tracking of an
inbound missile.
If the United States (US) is to become and remain well-defended against various
missile threats in the future, it is important to study the BMD enterprise as a whole
and identify strategies to optimize the enterprise with respect to risk and cost, all
while adhering to the priorities of the Department of Defense (DoD). To wit, Joint
Publication (JP) 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, provides the doctrinal
guidance for defense against air and missile threats targeting the United States and
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its allies, establishing the US BMD priorities with respect to protecting assets such
as high-value Geopolitical Assets/Areas and high-value air assets (HVAA) (United
States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017). Hereafter, we use the term high value assets or
HVAs to refer to the assets being protected by the BMD enterprise, distinguishing
them from the BMD assets (e.g., sensors, interceptors) within the enterprise.

Figure 1. Current and Future Potential Adversary Offensive Missile Capabilities - page
7, 2019 Missile Defense Review (United States Department of Defense, 2019)

The current and future landscape of missile defense must protect against attacks
by each of four types of missiles: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonic cruise
missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles (Speier et al., 2017). Ballistic missiles are
ubiquitous due to arms proliferation, and the defense against these missiles is at the
core of the current missile defense enterprise (United States Department of Defense,
2019). As can be seen in Figure 1, cruise missiles are only owned by China, Russia,
and Iran; they are much fewer in number than ballistic missiles for each nation (United
2

States Department of Defense, 2019), yet they pose a threat that must be effectively
countered. Lastly, both types of hypersonic weapons are currently a focus of research
and development by geopolitical adversaries (e.g., China, Russia), and for which the
US has no current defense (Speier et al., 2017).
Although each of the four types of missile threats have flight profiles that can
be decomposed for analysis, ballistic missiles are one of the simpler weapons to describe in terms of flight phases. The flight path of a BM is typically characterized via
three phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal (National Research Council,
2008). The boost phase consists of the time in which the missile is being powered by
a rocket from its launch, e.g., for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) having a range of over 5500 kilometers, into the upper atmosphere of Earth (National
Research Council, 2008). Once there, the missile separates from the booster, and
the payload adopts a ballistic trajectory towards its target, based upon the Earth’s
gravitational pull. Within the ballistic portion of the missile’s trajectory, the midcourse phase describes the time between payload separation and when the missile
re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere (National Research Council, 2008). The terminal
phase characterizes the remainder of the BM trajectory (National Research Council,
2008). The exact distinction between the midcourse and terminal phases is not rigid;
it depends on the range of the missile and the specific payload (National Research
Council, 2008). Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are guided and powered for
the entire flight to the target (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Hypersonic cruise missiles follow a trajectory similar to cruise missiles, albeit at Mach 5.0
or faster, thereby reducing the time during which a defender can detect and intercept
them (Speier et al., 2017). Finally, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are boosted into
the upper atmosphere (i.e., at 50 kilometers or higher but lower than a BM’s peak
trajectory) and return to the target at hypersonic speed with maneuverability during
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the terminal phase of flight (Speier et al., 2017).

Figure 2. Current Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense Architecture - page 42, 2019
Missile Defense Review (United States Department of Defense, 2019)

Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the assets currently resourced and
operational for US Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense. There are four distinct types
of sensors that comprise the sensing aspect of the BMD System: ground-based
and affixed, sea-based and mobile, space-based, and mobile ground-based. Groundbased and affixed in location are the Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance
(AN/TPY-2) in Turkey and Japan; Cobra Dane radar at Shemya, Alaska; and Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) systems in California, the United Kingdom,
and Greenland. The AN/TPY-2 is the largest air-transportable X-band radar in the
world, and it can discriminate objects in the midcourse phase of flight (Missile Defense Agency, 2018b). The Cobra Dane radar also provides midcourse coverage for the
BMD system and is capable of detecting objects out to 2000 miles (Missile Defense
Agency, 2016a). The UEWR provides midcourse coverage as well, but it is able to
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detect objects as far as 3000 miles away (Missile Defense Agency, 2016b). In addition
to the three current UEWR systems, two existing Early Warning Radar systems at
Clear Air Force Station, Alaska, and Cape Cod, Massachusetts, are expected to be
upgraded and operational in the near future (United States Department of Defense,
2019). Sea-based and mobile sensors include the Sea-based X-band (SBX) radar as
well as the Aegis radar system. The SBX radar is an X-band radar mounted on
a self-propelled, semi-submersible platform capable of patrolling the Pacific Ocean
when deployed (Missile Defense Agency, 2018a). The Aegis weapon system, which
is employed on 22 US Navy cruisers and 62 destroyers, uses a AN/SPY radar (US
Navy, 2019). Some of these ships patrol the Pacific Ocean and are capable of detecting (and intercepting) an intruder missile in the midcourse phase (US Navy, 2019).
Space-based sensors include two satellites in orbit that provide accurate tracks of
midcourse re-entry vehicles to BMD system interceptors (Missile Defense Agency,
2017b). This system was successfully demonstrated in 2013 when a test missile was
launched by the US from Hawaii towards a large empty area of the Pacific Ocean.
A space-based sensor relayed information to an Aegis ship, which launched an SM-3
missile and successfully intercepted the “intruder” (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Finally, selected, mobile ground-based assets have sensors to support
terminal intercept of inbound BMs. For example, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has a built-in AN/TPY-2 radar that provides updated tracking data
to its interceptors (Missile Defense Agency, 2018b).
The cost and feasibility of successfully detecting and intercepting a missile is not
uniform across the sequential stages of its flight (National Research Council, 2008).
Because intercepting missiles in the boost phase has been deemed to be too impractical to date, intercepting them in the midcourse phase has been the next logical
point of focus. Interception in the midcourse phase has its own set of challenges,
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such as the midcourse discrimination problem. When a ballistic missile enters the
midcourse phase, the payload is no longer being propelled by its booster and employs
various decoys to make it difficult to intercept (National Research Council, 2008). To
destroy the missile, the interceptor must be able to correctly distinguish the missile
from the decoys. The sensors employed by current missile defense systems are tasked
with identifying the actual missile threat among the decoy threats. Finally, interception during the terminal phase is accompanied by greater certainty with respect
to detecting, identifying, and tracking a threat, but it has relative disadvantages.
Given the geographic expanse of the Continental United States, terminal defense of
all potential HVAs requires an extensive investment in many systems. More expensive
systems designed for boost or midcourse detection (and intercept) may be less costly,
in aggregate, to achieve the same outcomes.
The US BMD system consists of several assets capable of intercepting a missile
in different phases of its flight, and which are designed to provide a layered defense of assets (United States Department of Defense, 2019; Thompson, 2020). The
US possesses the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which consists
of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) (United States Department of Defense, 2019).
These interceptors are staged at Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base
in California (United States Department of Defense, 2019). The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is a mobile system capable of intercepting missiles
in their terminal phase of flight (United States Department of Defense, 2019). The
US currently possesses seven THAAD batteries placed around the world, including
Guam and the Republic of Korea (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Each
THAAD battery is comprised of a truck-mounted launcher which can be loaded with
as many as eight interceptors (Missile Defense Agency, 2018b). The Phased Array
Tracking Intercept of Target (PATRIOT) missile defense system is another BMD as-
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set capable of intercepting missiles in their terminal phase of flight (United States
Department of Defense, 2019). There are currently eight battalions with thirty-three
PATRIOT batteries stationed in the US and seven battalions with twenty-seven PATRIOT batteries stationed overseas (United States Department of Defense, 2019).
Each of these batteries consists of six launchers (with some possible exceptions), and
each launcher is capable of firing either 16 PAC-3 missiles or 4 PAC-2 missiles simultaneously (Gourley, 2011).
A specific missile threat to the US and its allies that motivates this study arises
from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In recent years, there has
been an escalation in the DPRK’s missile capability and testing that poses increasing
danger. In 1998, the DPRK launched their first ballistic missile – the Taepodong1 (Arms Control Association, 2019). Shortly thereafter, the DPRK agreed to stop
testing and launching ballistic missiles. For the next ten years, there were only a
few isolated incidents that could be classified as a missile test. However, in the most
recent ten years, there has been a significant increase in testing, and in the last
year alone, there have been at least eight reported tests (Arms Control Association,
2019). These various events comprise testing of both short-range ballistic missiles
and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, most of which terminated their flight in the
Sea of Japan without causing any physical harm (Arms Control Association, 2019).
In addition to the increase in quantity of its ballistic missile tests, the DPRK has
achieved increasing success of its testing. Between 1998 and 2014, there were approximately six successful DPRK missile launches (Arms Control Association, 2019).
Since then, there have been approximately 25 successful DPRK tests related to ballistic missiles. Most of those tests simply launch a missile, but some tests relate to
the engines that propel the missiles into the upper atmosphere.
The US BMD Enterprise includes assets deliberately arrayed to counter the threat
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of ballistic missile attack against CONUS by the DPRK. As discussed previously, the
assets that the US has to intercept a missile fired from the DPRK include the GBIs
in Fort Greely, Alaska, which are staged directly under the expected path of a DPRK
ballistic missile (United States Department of Defense, 2019). In addition, the Aegis
cruisers deployed by the US Navy are capable of defending the areas near Japan that
the DPRK missiles historically have flown over during their tests.
Recently, there has been a lack of consensus regarding not only the investments
that should be made to the future US missile defense enterprise, but also regarding
the question of where to locate the current assets and allocate the existing resources
to be most effective. For example, the US Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
recently advocated for the US Department of Defense to reconsider the use of Aegis
ships being used to statically patrol a region of the Pacific Ocean to protect against
the missile threat from the DPRK, and the CNO proposed DoD simply leverage
ground-based systems to protect those assets instead (Larter, David B., 2018). If the
US missile defense system is to be most effective, an enterprise-wide examination is
necessary, leveraging appropriate modeling to recommend future courses of action for
resource investment.

1.2

Problem Statement
Given the motivating problem, this research seeks to address the following problem

statement:
Efficiently allocate and locate limited detection-and-tracking and interception
resources within a Ballistic Missile Defense enterprise to effectively1 defend a
set of stationary, ground-based assets against an intercontinental ballistic missile
1

This adverb implies the US priority goals and tradeoffs via multiple, (potentially) competing
objectives.
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attack, while seeking solution robustness to account for increasingly sophisticated
adversary strategies.
However, we note the necessarily classified nature of selected capabilities in the
U.S. missile defense enterprise. For that reason, this research instead addresses an
analogue to the aforementioned problem statement, while still accounting for important characteristics of both ballistic missiles and the BMD enterprise.
Although the aforementioned problem statement indicates defense against a ballistic missile threat, we seek to develop models suitable for countering BM, CM, HGV,
or HCM threats, subject to appropriate parameterization. As such, the models within
this research should be generalizable to a threat having characteristics common to
each of these types of missiles. Each type of missile has a launch point, an HVA target,
and a spatiotemporal flight path, the latter of which is commonly decomposed into
phases for the application of defensive assets (e.g., boost, midcourse, and terminal
stages of flight for a BM).
With respect to countering an intruding missile, the defensive efforts in each stage
of flight are comprised of enterprise resources applied to respectively detect, track,
and subsequently intercept the missile. Of course, the entire defensive enterprise
performance is of interest, not any stage-specific performance.
Moreover, successful intercept of missiles is not the only metric for success. If
the enterprise can perform in an efficient manner with respect to other outcomes
(e.g., absolute enterprise cost, modifications to an existing enterprise, return on investments), the enterprise is more likely to garner the support from military and
political leadership needed to acquire, deploy, and operate it. Additionally, such outcomes have minimal acceptable standards of performance; whereas cost should be
minimized, there does exist limited capital (i.e., budget) for acquiring new assets for
the enterprise.
9

Thus, from a practical perspective, this research addresses the previously mentioned problem statement indirectly by orienting instead on the more generalized
problem statement:
Efficiently allocate and locate limited detection, tracking, and interception resources within a defensive enterprise to effectively defend a set of stationary,
assets against an attack by multiple intruding assets, for which the intrusion
paths can be reasonably decomposed into geospatial (and possibly spatiotemporal)
stages, while seeking solution robustness to account for increasingly sophisticated
adversary strategies.

1.3

Intended Contributions
This dissertation will make three contributions to the literature, which collectively

will address the problem statement in Section 1.2, albeit for the more generalized (i.e.,
unclassified) framework of intercepting intruders using assets within a detection-andinterception enterprise. To wit, this research will:
1. Develop an enterprise model to locate and allocate limited resources for the
effective detection and intercept an agent for which the intrusion plan is known.
2. Develop an enterprise model to locate and allocate resources for the effective
and efficient detection and intercept of agents for which the decision maker has
limited knowledge about intrusion plans.
3. Within the context of a Stackelberg game, develop an enterprise model to allocate resources for the effective detection and intercept of agents for which
the possible intrusion paths are known, but the agents observing the location
decisions and subsequently traverse routes corresponding to a (collective) best
response.
10

1.4

Organization of the Dissertation
Chapters II, III, and IV respectively address the three enumerated contributions

in Section 1.3 wherein each chapter motivates and describes the problem of interest,
reviews the pertinent literature (or literature to be surveyed) that informs modeling and/or solution methodology development, and presents the expected modeling
techniques, solution methods, and/or analyses.
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II. Enterprise Resource Location-Allocation to Detect and
Interdict Intruders

2.1

Introduction
Many contemporary problems require an enterprise model that aims to identify

the appropriate use of disparate resources to detect and intercept intruders in a system. One such problem is ballistic missile defense (BMD), wherein a defender must
array sets of radars and interceptors to defend cities against an adversary’s launch
of ballistic missiles. Other problems such as border protection, the interdiction of
refugee movement, cybersecurity, and the prevention of infection spread by natural
biological immune systems are likewise characterized by similar objectives, resourceoutcome relationships, and constraints. Each of these motivating applications entails
a defender seeking to protect fixed assets and an intruder attempting to reach, and
possibly attack, those assets by traversing a spatial region. As it relates to a BMD application, intruder missiles seek to destroy high value assets (HVAs) in the defender’s
territory. In the refugee and border protection application, refugees seek safe havens
and resources such as shelter and water within the territory of the defender (Mahecic,
2020). In the cybersecurity application, a hacker may attempt to steal sensitive user
data from a server within a computer network (Schlesinger and Solomon, 2020). In
the immune system application, an infection may attempt to spread to attack vital
organs via the bloodstream (O’Connell and Cafasso, 2018).
Each of these applications also has defenders with a set of HVAs to protect, as
well as limited resources to aid in that protection. The resources of the defender typically contribute towards either detection or interception of the intruder(s) although,
for selected applications, a subset of resources may serve both purposes. In the border protection application, sensors along the border and the region within it alert a
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defender to border crossings and enable interceptors (e.g., border agents) to meet,
detain, and process the refugees. In the cybersecurity application, firewalls inhibit
access to a network and alert users of attempts to steal data, as well as enable efficient
employment of (virtual and physical) countermeasures to interdict the intrusion attempt and prevent further penetration of the network. In the immune system, white
blood cells patrol the body and, if an infection is detected by receptors on the surface
of the white blood cell, more are sent to interdict the infection and multiply rapidly
to fight it. (For this application, white blood cells both detect and interdict intruding
infection agents.) In the BMD application, a defender’s radar assets detect and track
intruder missiles, and defender interceptors engage and destroy the missiles.
These applications also exhibit a defender allocating detection and interception
resources to different spatial stages of a would-be intruder’s attack. In the BMD application, inbound ballistic missiles have three stages of flight (i.e., boost, midcourse,
and terminal (National Research Council, 2008)), and the defender attempts detect
and intercept the intruder in each stage. In the border application, similar to the
BMD application, there are multiple layers of detection and interception in place.
This framework allows border officials more opportunities to detect refugee movement. In the cybersecurity application, a firewall uses multiple filters to attempt to
detect malicious packets of information and then discards them if they are deemed
malicious. The infection application can be partitioned into stages (e.g., introduction, bloodstream, organs), although the body’s immune system does not necessarily
consider them separately.
In each of these applications, it is also apparent that an enterprise approach is
necessary. Examining the costs of, and resource allocation to, the various BMD assets should be conducted on an enterprise level rather than an asset-by-asset basis.
Examining only the sensors in the BMD application allows for tracking of an intruder
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missile, but if the interceptors are not located optimally, the missile can still damage an HVA, unimpeded. In the border security application, if sensors are placed
optimally and the border crossings are detected but the refugees are not intercepted,
the enterprise has failed to achieve its intended outcomes. If users are only alerted
to a network breach after data is stolen by a hacker and there are no firewalls in
place, the cybersecurity enterprise is likewise unsuccessful. If the human body fails
to rapidly multiply the white blood cells surrounding an infection, the infection will
continue to spread and attack more areas of the body. A holistic approach allows
for a more cost-effective allocation of resources within the enterprise while addressing
the system-wide outcomes, vis-á-vis a myopic approach that yields suboptimal costs
and performance.
In each of these different applications, optimizing one area of a defense enterprise
is not sufficient. There is a natural trade-space to be examined between the cost
and performance of an enterprise. When considering the relative priorities imposed
on the different objectives, a more detailed tradeoff analysis is appropriate. Given
the motivating problems above, this research seeks to address the following problem
statement:
Given two respective sets of detection resources and interdiction resources, each
having different types of resources with heterogeneous capabilities, locate and
allocate them over a sequence of spatially-defined stages and respective candidate
locations within each stage to effectively detect and intercept an intruder for
which the intrusion plan is known.

2.1.1

Literature Review

There are several threads of research pertinent to the aforementioned problem
statement, and a review of the published, technical literature relating to the different
14

threads is necessary. The major areas of research related to this study are resource
location and allocation models, enterprise resource models, and network interdiction
models. The literature on resource location and allocation is rich and extensive,
encompassing various types of problems over a large span of time. This research
thread can be traced back to Hakimi’s (1964) early study of location problems, and
later followed by Matlin (1970), who studied the Missile Allocation Problem (MAP).
MAP adopts the offensive framework of allocating missiles to targets in a manner
that maximizes the expected damage inflicted. Beyond the more abstract problem
of allocating resources is the examination of resource location, as well as resource
location-and-allocation. Considering binary coverage assumptions (i.e., a demand either is covered or not by a located facility), there are two major classes of models
in this thread. Within the first major class, set covering location problems (e.g.,
Church and ReVelle (1976)) and maximal covering location problems (e.g., Church
and ReVelle (1974); Berman and Krass (2002)) identify the optimal location of facilities having fixed covering distances to serve demands and seek to minimize the
number (or cost) of facilities used as well as maximize the demands covered, alternatively as objectives or constraints. Within the second major class, p-median and
p-center techniques determine location-and-allocation decisions (Hakimi, 1964, 1965),
wherein every demand is covered by (i.e., assigned to) a facility, but a specified, limiting covering range does not exist for facilities. Additional examinations consider
partial coverage (Karasakal and Karasakal, 2004) and probabilistic coverage (Daskin,
1983). Beyond the scope of this review are several extensive surveys of the related
literature. An interested reader is referred to works by Drezner and Hamacher (2001),
Daskin (2011), Laporte et al. (2015), and Church and Murray (2018).
The literature that specifically applies resource location and allocation methodologies to locating detection and interdiction resources (hereafter referred to equiva-
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lently as a sensor and interdictor location problem) is also quite extensive, although
the applications are more nuanced. Related to BMD, there is work within a game
theoretic context that studies optimally placing missile batteries (e.g., Han et al.
(2016), Boardman et al. (2017)). These works use the framework of a two-person,
three-stage, extensive form, zero-sum game for which there is assumed to be complete
and perfect information between players to model the BMD engagement. In a border
protection application, Musman et al. (1997) studied the issue of detecting elusive
targets along a border with using limited sensor assets, and Lessin et al. (2019) examined the problem of relocating sensors to account for incapacitated or degraded
sensors. In the cybersecurity domain, allocating sensors to an information system to
minimize compromised information is also studied (e.g., Nandi et al. (2016)). Related to biological immune systems, Huang (2000) developed algorithms that mimic
the body’s immuno-response to disease or infection, leveraging those algorithms to
solve other location-allocation problems.
Unlike resource location and allocation research, the published literature is relatively sparse as it pertains to enterprise resource models for sensor and interdictor
location problems. Within the literature, there does exist a robust stream of research
pertaining to enterprise resource planning (ERP) (e.g., see Shehab et al., 2004), a
field of research focusing on the business processes within an organization, as well
as the sub-discipline of material requirements planning (MRP) (e.g., see Morecroft,
1983), a production-focused examination of the materials, processes, and resources
leveraged to attain a specific product. The frameworks for resource planning in these
areas differ too much from the problem herein to inform a modeling approach, so we
refer a reader interested in more information on ERP to the works of Umble et al.
(2003) and Monk and Wagner (2012). The relative dearth of literature specific to
this enterprise resource modeling results from a number of factors. Among these fac-
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tors, it is challenging to represent disparate assets within an enterprise with accurate
representation of their effects with respect to common performance metrics. One
related work that applied this concept to anti-terrorism efforts is a study by Lunday
et al. (2010), for which the goal was to model the application of defense resources to
combat terrorism efforts and minimize the expected damage caused by a terrorist organization. Another study by Moghaddam and Nof (2014) examined the problem of
making location-allocation decisions in collaborative networks of service enterprises.
While similar, this differs too greatly from the scope of this work since it focuses
mainly on meeting overall demands of completing tasks instead of a multi-stage location problem like the one studied herein. Beyond these studies, finding related works
that apply a holistic approach to solving the sensor and interdictor location problem
are elusive.
Because the current research problem seeks to detect and interdict intruders, the
literature related to network interdiction can yield relevant modeling frameworks and
insights. Within a military context, the concept of network interdiction originated in
Ancient Roman times when the Persian cavalry cut Greek supply lines and routes to
water sources in battle (Wood, 2010). The general problem can be stated easily in
the context of a directed graph, in which an enemy attempts to traverse from node
s to node t and an interdictor tries to “break” arcs in order to stop the enemy from
being able to complete the journey (Wood, 1993). Beyond the scope of this work,
there exist several surveys of this field of literature. Interested readers are referred to
works by Cormican et al. (1998), Israeli and Wood (2002), and Wood (2010).
Several articles exist that specifically apply network interdiction to a sensor and
interdictor location problem. For example, Brown et al. (2005) examined a twosided approach to theater BMD and used network interdiction principles to set a
framework for the problem. In a border security, Morton et al. (2007) formulated
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models to interdict drug smugglers with nuclear material in the Former Soviet Union
by locating radiation sensors. In the cybersecurity application, Nandi and Medal
(2016) proposed four network interdiction models designed to aid in removing links
in a computer network to minimize the spread of infections. Even using the human
immune system as an application to network interdiction has been attempted in recent
years. The author de Grey (2005) proposed interdicting (in this case, deleting) the
genes required for telomere elongation from as many cells as possible, which is a large
factor in cancerous growths reaching a life-threatening stage.
Because our problem consists of modeling two agents and their interactions, a
game theoretic context has merit for consideration. To wit, the aforementioned network interdiction studies are Stackelberg games (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2008),
a form of two-player, extensive form games with perfect information and complete information. Within the network interdiction literature, several works of note examine
such games in the absence of either the perfect information assumption (e.g., Zheng
and Castañón (2012), Yates (2013)) or the complete information game (e.g., Zhang
and Ramirez-Marquez (2013), Borrero et al. (2016)). The work herein describes a
framework in which one player is making decisions, and thus is not a game-theoretic
framework. However, this literature motivates extensions to this research that inform
the modeling structures. Herein, we seek a model for the underlying problem that
achieves high quality solutions quickly, so it will portend practical tractability when
embedded within a game theoretic framework in a sequel to this research.
This research makes three contributions to the literature. First, it sets forth
a baseline mathematical programming model – and seven alternative variants – to
address the underlying problem of allocating limited resources for the detection and
interdiction of an intruder. Second, it conducts empirical testing to evaluate and
compare the effect of alternative model variants on the efficacy and efficiency of a
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leading commercial solver to identify optimal solutions. Third, it rigorously examines
the impact of selected problem features on the ability of a leading commercial solver
to address larger instances of the underlying problem, portending its utility for larger
applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the modeling notation (e.g., sets, parameters, and decision variables) and the mathematical
programming formulation variants. Section 2.3 presents the empirical testing, results,
and analysis. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes the work and provides recommendations
for future research.

2.2

Models and Solution Methodology
To formulate the mathematical program to address the underlying problem, it is

necessary to define the following sets, parameters, and decision variables.
Sets.
• N = {1, 2, ..., N } is the number of distinguishable geo-spatial stages over which
the intruder may be detected and interdicted by the defender’s enterprise of
sensors and interdictors, indexed by n. (If N = 1, the following models remain
valid, but the indexing of selected sets, parameters, decision variables, and
constraints on n can be set aside.) Relative to the set of stages, two assumptions
are made regarding the intruder’s path. First, we assume that the intruder’s
intended path transits every stage. Second, the stages are numbered according
to the order in which the intruder will attempt to transit them.
• D = {1, 2, ..., D} is the set of different detection resource types, indexed by d,
each of which pertains to different capabilities (e.g., range, effectiveness).
• J = {1, 2, ..., J } is the set of possible locations at which detection resources can
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be located, indexed by j.
– The set J is partitioned by stage, i.e., J =

S

n∈N

Jn and

T

n∈N

Jn = ∅.

• I = {1, 2, ..., I} is the set of different interdiction resource types, indexed by
i, each of which has different capabilities (e.g., speed, range, probability of
success).
• K = {1, 2, ..., K} is the set of possible locations at which interdiction resources
can be located, indexed by k. Similar to set J, the set K is likewise partitioned
over N .
Parameters.
• uDd : The maximum number of detection resources of type d that can be emplaced.
• uIi : The maximum number of interdiction resources of type i that can be emplaced.
• pDdj : The probability that an intruder is detected by a detection resource of type
d emplaced at location j.
• pIik : The conditional probability that an intruder is interdicted by an interdiction resource of type i emplaced at location k given it has been detected.
Decision Variables.
• xdj : equals 1 if a detection resource of type d is emplaced at location j, and 0
otherwise.
• yik : equals 1 if an interdiction resource of type i is emplaced at location k, and
0 otherwise.
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• αik : equals 1 if an interdiction resource of type i emplaced at location k ∈ Kn
is used to attempt to interdict the intruder in stage n, and 0 otherwise.
• πnD : The conditional probability that an intruder is detected in stage n given it
has successfully traversed previous stages, i.e., 1, . . . , n − 1.
• πnI : The conditional probability that an intruder is interdicted in stage n given
it has successfully traversed previous stages, i.e., 1, . . . , n − 1.
D

• πn

T

I

: The conditional probability of an intruder being detected and interdicted

in stage n given it has successfully traversed previous stages, i.e., 1, . . . , n − 1.
• πD

T

I

: The total probability of an intruder being detected and interdicted.

Leveraging the aforementioned notation, we formulate the Resource Allocation for
Intruder Detection and Interdiction (RAIDI) model as follows.

max π D

T

s.t. π D

T

πnD

T

I

I

(1)
=1−

Y

1 − πnD

T

I



,

(2)

n∈N
I

= πnD πnI ,
Y Y
x
πnD = 1 −
1 − pDdj dj ,

∀ n ∈ N,

(3)

∀ n ∈ N,

(4)

∀j ∈ J,

(5)

∀ n ∈ N,

(6)

∀ n ∈ N,

(7)

∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ Kn , n ∈ N,

(8)

d∈D j∈Jn

X

xdj ≤ 1,

d∈D

πnI = 1 −

XX


αik 1 − pIik yik ,

i∈I k∈Kn

XX

αik = 1,

i∈I k∈Kn

αik ∈ {0, 1} ,
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X

xdj ≤ uDd ,

∀d ∈ D,

(9)

yik ≤ uIi ,

∀i ∈ I,

(10)

xdj ∈ {0, 1},

∀d ∈ D, j ∈ J

(11)

yik ∈ {0, 1},

∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K

(12)

j∈J

X
k∈K

The decision maker seeks to maximize the probability of the detection and subsequent interdiction of an intruder via the objective function (1). Constraint (2) computes this probability as a function of the stage-specific probabilities of detectionand-interdiction, which are assumed to be independent. Likewise, Constraint (3)
calculates each stage-specific probability as the product of the respective probabilities of detecting and interdicting the intruder in a given stage, each of which are also
assumed to be independent. Constraint (4) calculates the overall probability that an
intruder is not detected in stage n. For the purpose of computing stage-specific probabilities of interdiction, this model assumes one interdiction resource is to be used in
each stage to interdict a possible intruder. Constraint (5) prevents the emplacement
of more than one detection resource at any location. Constraint (6) calculates the
probability of an intruder not being interdicted in each stage, which is calculated to
be the smallest probability that the intruder is not interdicted over every interdiction
resource type in stage n. Constraints (7) and (8) set limitations on the αik -variables
such that at most one interdiction resource-location combination may be utilized in
each stage. Lastly, Constraints (9) and (10) limit the number of resources that can be
emplaced and Constraints (11) and (12) ensure that the decision variables are binary.
One can alternatively impose Constraint (13) in lieu of Constraint (4), provided
it can be assumed that at most one detection resource of any type would be emplaced
at any location j ∈ J, as enforced by Constraint (5). This limitation is not enforced
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on the interdiction assets, so it is possible that more than one interdiction asset can
be emplaced at a single location.
!
πnD = 1 −

Y

1−

j∈Jn

X

pDdj xdj

∀n∈N

,

(13)

d∈D

Likewise, one can consider a linear set of constraints as an alternative to Constraint (6). Defining a new decision variable βik = aik yik , Constraint (6) is alternatively represented as Constraint (14) with the βik -variables restricted to binary values
via Constraint (18). In lieu of the defined nonlinear transformation, the effective relationship is enforced linearly via Constraints (15)–(17).

πnI = 1 −

XX


αik − pIik βik ,

∀ n ∈ N,

(14)

βik ≥ αik + yik − 1,

∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ Kn , n ∈ N,

(15)

βik ≤ αik ,

∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ Kn , n ∈ N,

(16)

βik ≤ yik ,

∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ Kn , n ∈ N,

(17)

βik ∈ {0, 1} ,

∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ Kn , n ∈ N

(18)

i∈I k∈Kn

Given the two alternative constraint substitutions, we have four formulation variants to consider.

2.3

Testing, Results, and Analysis
This section details the design and conduct of empirical testing to evaluate and

compare the efficacy of the alternative formulations corresponding to different combinations of methods for computing πnD and πnI , respectively. Section 2.3.1 describes
both the overall test design of specific scenarios and the methods by which individual test instances are generated for each scenario. Section 2.3.2 presents the testing
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results over a set a baseline scenarios, along with an examination of the effects of
alternative formulations on both the solution quality and the time to identify an optimal solution. Subsequent analysis in Section 2.3.3 identifies via an experimental
design the effect of selected problem features on both the efficacy and efficiency of
the best performing model.
Each instance of the model variants was solved on a 2.8 GHz PC with 64 GB of
RAM and an Intel(R) Xeon X5660 processor, and using GAMS modeling language
(Version 30.1.0) to invoke BARON (Version 19.12.7), a commercial solver designed
for global optimization of nonconvex math programs. BARON was applied with a
time limit of 15 minutes and a relative optimality gap of 0% for each instance. To
solve subproblems, BARON invoked IBM ILOG CPLEX (Version 12.10.0) and/or
MINOS (Version 5.5), as appropriate. Testing was completed using the NEOS solver
(Gropp and Moré, 1997; Czyzyk et al., 1998; Dolan, 2001), and batch runs were
resubmitted as necessary to ensure all testing was conducted on a platform having
the aforementioned performance specifications, to facilitate equitable comparison of
empirical testing results.
Because BARON leverages a branch and bound framework with the imposition of
both feasibility and optimality cuts, conventional wisdom indicates that solver convergence is enhanced via the imposition of tight lower and upper bounds on all decision
variables to reduce the volume of the hyperrectangle BARON will iteratively decompose (Ryoo and Sahinidis, 1995, 1996; Sahinidis, 1996; Tawarmalani and Sahinidis,
2004, 2005). As such, each of the four model variants is also examined both with and
D

without the imposition of simple bounds of [0, 1] on each of the πnD -, πnI -, πn
πD

T

I

T

I

-, and

-variables. Table 1 depicts the eight RAIDI model variants tested in subsequent

sections and, for each model, how its construction differs.
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Table 1. RAIDI Model Variants Tested
Model Variant
default
altdet
altint
altdetint
default-b
altdet-b
altint-b
altdetint-b

2.3.1

πnD Constraints
(4)
(13)
(4)
(13)
(4)
(13)
(4)
(13)

πnI Constraints
(6)
(6)
(14)-(18)
(14)-(18)
(6)
(6)
(14)-(18)
(14)-(18)

[0, 1] Variable Bounding
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES

Test Instance Generation

The relative performance of model variants may differ due both to problem features and instance features. Within this context, we define problem features for
RAIDI formulations as the number of stages, N ; the number of types of detection
resources, D; the number of possible locations at which detection resources can be
located, J ; the number of types of interdiction resources, I; and the number of possible locations at which interdiction resources can be located, K. Hereafter, we define
a RAIDI scenario as a specific set of values for the (N , D, J , I, K)-features.
Scenario generation for testing in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 is determined via combinations of low, medium, and high levels for each of the problem features. Table 2
presents the respective problem feature levels.
Table 2. Feature Levels Examined for RAIDI Problem Scenarios
Problem
Feature
N
D
J
I
K

Feature Levels
Low Medium High
3
4
5
2
3
4
12
16
20
2
3
4
6
8
10

In contrast, we define an instance of a RAIDI problem to be specific to a given
scenario. Each instance may vary with respect to the respective partitions of possible
detection and interdiction resource locations over stages (i.e., Jn and Kn , ∀ n ∈ N );
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the respective numbers of detection and interdiction resources, by type (i.e., uDd , ∀ d ∈
D and uIi , ∀ i ∈ I); and the respective detection and interdiction probabilities (i.e.,
pDdj - and pIik -parameters, indexed accordingly).
In testing throughout Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, this research generates RAIDI
instances for a given scenario in the following manner. A batch of 30 instances is
iteratively generated for the scenario via fixed pseudo-random number generation
seeds in GAMS, and each instance is iteratively solved for each of the model variants
in Table 1. For the purpose of instance generation and testing, the partitions of
possible locations for respective detection and interdiction resources over stages (i.e.,
Jn and Kn ) are stochastically generated within the GAMS model, with the provision
that at least one of each location type is assigned to each stage.
Informing specific parameter values, we assume that higher values of the indices
d and i correspond to more capable detection and interdiction resource types, which
are likely more expensive and, hence, available in lesser amounts. In general, we
expect detection resources to be more prolific than interdiction resources, given for
each stage n ∈ N the RAIDI model considers the effect of all detection resources but
only allows for one interdiction resource to be assigned to the intruder. Accordingly,
we generate a uDd - and uIi -parameters as a function of the scenario parameters. Logical
lower and upper bounds on uDd are respectively induced by (i) an assumption that at
least one detection resource will be emplaced in every stage and (ii) the combination
of the number of resource locations and an assumption that detection resources will
not be co-located. Equation (19) illustrates for uDd , ∀ d ∈ D, the generation of a
value from a uniform distribution on [N , J ] and the allocation of an integer-valued
proportion of that value by resource type. For example, if D = 3, a ratio of (1/2),
(1/3), and (1/6) of the respectively generated values would be used to compute uDd
for d = 1, 2, 3, respectively. Similarly, for interdiction types, Equation (20) illustrates
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for uIi , ∀i ∈ I, the generation of a value from a uniform distribution on [N , 2N ]. This
upper bound for each type of interdiction resources differs from that of the detection
resources because, as previously mentioned, we expect the amount of interdiction
resources to be less than that of the detection resources. This upper bound limits
each type of interdiction resource to no more than an average of two per stage.
&"
uDd =



(D + 1) − d

. X

#

'

d U [N , J ] , ∀ d ∈ D

(19)

d∈D

&"
uIi =



(I + 1) − i

. X

#

'

i U [N , 2N ] , ∀ i ∈ I

(20)

i∈I

Probability parameters also vary by resource type (i.e., d and i, respectively), assuming that types having higher indices are the more capable (and more expensive,
hence less available) resources. Accordingly, the instance probabilities are generated
in a manner that assigns higher probabilities of detection and interdiction to the
higher-valued indices of detection and interdiction type, respectively. For detection


assets, a probability range of pDmin , pDmax = [0.2, 0.8] is partitioned into D intervals
having equal width, assigning the intervals to resource types with the highest-valued
types having the highest probability interval, and so forth. As a modification of the
aforementioned procedure to prevent a completely hierarchical partition of resources
by type, we modify the partitions of the probability range so the individual intervals
overlap one another by 10% of their interval widths. The probabilities of interdiction
by type are generated in an identical manner and with an identical probability range


of pImin , pImax = [0.2, 0.8]. Equations (21) and (22) detail the instance-specific generation of the by-resource-type probabilities of detection and interdiction, respectively,
via uniform distributions, and wherein ∆D =

D
pD
U B −pLB
D

and ∆I =

pIU B −pILB
.
I



pDdj = U pDLB + (d − 1) · ∆D , pDLB + d · ∆D , ∀ d ∈ D, j ∈ J
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(21)



pIik = U pILB + (i − 1) · ∆I , pILB + i · ∆I , ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K

(22)

Figure 3. Illustrative Instance of RAIDI

Figure 3 is an illustrative instance of RAIDI in which N = 3, D = 2, J = 12,
I = 2, and K = 6.

2.3.2

RAIDI Model Variant Testing and Comparison for Baseline Scenarios

In this section, empirical testing compares the solution quality and computational
effort required of the BARON commercial solver to identify a globally optimal solution
to each of the RAIDI model variants in Table 1. Each model variant is tested for
30 instances of each baseline scenario presented in Table 3, wherein the scenarios
respectively consist of the low, medium, and high levels for features from Table 2.
Table 3. Baseline RAIDI Problem Scenarios
Scenario
Low Feature Level (LFL)
Medium Feature Level (MFL)
High Feature Level (HFL)
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(N , D, J , I, K)
(3, 2, 12, 2, 6)
(4, 3, 16, 3, 8)
(5, 4, 20, 4, 10)

The hierarchy of metrics to assess the relative performance of model variants are,
in order, the objective function value(s) attained, the relative optimality gap (%)
identified upon termination, the required computational effort, and the number of
instances on which the solver terminated due to limits on the computational effort.
Whereas the solution quality is of foremost importance, we use the relative optimality
gap as the second criterion; if the solver does not find a solution it identifies as globally
optimal – even though it may be globally optimal – upon termination due to time
limitations, it is of notable interest to assess how well the model variant enables
a solver assessment of the solution quality. Of tertiary importance is the required
computational effort. Finally, we report and consider the number of instances for
which the solver terminated due to time limitations (i.e., “terminated early”) before
identifying a global optimum.
Tables 4–6 report the testing results for the LFL, MFL, and HFL scenarios, respectively. The first column in each table presents the model variant tested. For each
variant, the second through fourth columns present the average and standard deviations for the objective function value upon termination, the relative optimality gap
(%) identified upon termination, and the computational effort required (seconds) by
the commercial solver BARON. The final column reports the number of instances (out
of 30) for which the solver terminated due to the 900 second limit on computational
effort.
The results shown in Table 4 indicate that, when feature levels are set to low
values, there is little differentiation in the performance of BARON among the model
variants. The average objective function values obtained for each model variant across
the 30 instances were identical, as were the relative optimality gaps. The only difference between the model variants was the average computational effort required to
solve the instances, although it is worth noting that BARON did not terminate any
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Table 4. RAIDI Model Variant Performances (Means and Standard Deviations) for
Selected Performance Metrics over 30 Synthetic Instances of the LFL Scenario

Model
default
default-b
altdet
altdet-b
altint
altint-b
altdetint
altdetint-b

Objective
Fn. Value.
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029
0.955 ± 0.029

Relative
Gap (%)
0±0
0±0
0±0
0±0
0±0
0±0
0±0
0±0

Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
4.413 ± 10.619
2.579 ± 8.998
1.083 ± 3.060
0.419 ± 1.062
2.360 ± 6.650
1.150 ± 2.079
1.635 ± 6.841
0.751 ± 1.961

No. Instances
Terminated Early
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

instances early for any model variant.
Table 5. RAIDI Model Variant Performances (Means and Standard Deviations) for
Selected Performance Metrics over 30 Synthetic Instances of the MFL Scenario

Model
default
default-b
altdet
altdet-b
altint
altint-b
altdetint
altdetint-b

Objective
Fn. Value.
0.981 ± 0.018
0.981 ± 0.019
0.982 ± 0.018
0.982 ± 0.018
0.981 ± 0.018
0.981 ± 0.018
0.982 ± 0.018
0.982 ± 0.018

Relative
Gap (%)
0.016 ± 0.017
0.017 ± 0.017
0.012 ± 0.015
0.013 ± 0.018
0.022 ± 0.083
0.016 ± 0.018
0.008 ± 0.013
0.014 ± 0.017

Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
750.631 ± 334.090
800.990 ± 270.612
653.572 ± 341.859
633.950 ± 347.910
334.852 ± 430.298
738.775 ± 328.320
570.398 ± 383.965
751.583 ± 285.066

No. Instances
Terminated Early
25
26
18
18
11
24
16
23

Table 5 describes the results found when the model variants are used to solve
30 instances of the MFL scenario. The average objective function values obtained
were nearly the same, as was the case in the LFL scenario. The average relative
gaps obtained by the eight model variants were also similar in value, ranging from
0.008% to 0.022%. Similar to the LFL scenario results, the average computational
effort required to solve the 30 instances provided the most differentiation between
model variants. The altint model variant yielded the lowest average computational
effort required. However, altint also had the worst relative optimality gap results,
whereas the default-b model variant yielded the highest average computational effort
required. As expected, these two model variants respectively had the least (11) and
most (26) number of instances for which the solver terminated early due to the limit
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on run time.
Table 6. RAIDI Model Variant Performances (Means and Standard Deviations) for
Selected Performance Metrics over 30 Synthetic Instances of the HFL Scenario

Model
default
default-b
altdet
altdet-b
altint
altint-b
altdetint
altdetint-b

Objective
Fn. Value.
0.990 ± 0.011
0.990 ± 0.010
0.990 ± 0.010
0.991 ± 0.009
0.990 ± 0.010
0.991 ± 0.009
0.991 ± 0.009
0.991 ± 0.009

Relative
Gap (%)
0.010 ± 0.010
0.010 ± 0.010
0.286 ± 0.021
0.009 ± 0.009
0.020 ± 0.059
0.009 ± 0.009
0.271 ± 0.206
0.049 ± 0.009

Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
900.015 ± 0.095
870.275 ± 160.966
900.050 ± 0.259
900.019 ± 0.116
481.369 ± 446.079
870.011 ± 161.447
899.990 ± 0.044
899.994 ± 0.049

No. Instances
Terminated Early
30
29
30
30
15
29
30
30

Table 6 shows the HFL scenario results, which indicate that as the feature levels
rise, there are more differences for the performance of BARON between the model
variants. As was the case in the LFL and MFL scenario results, the objective function
values were nearly identical across all model variants. The average relative optimality
gap amongst the eight model variants varied more widely. Notably, altdet, altdetint,
and altboth had the highest average relative optimality gaps and default, default-b,
altdet-b, and altint-b had the lowest. Collectively, these results indicate that introducing bounds on decision variables leads to lower relative optimality gaps, as expected.
The average computational effort required to solve the instances are all similarly high
(and close to or effectively 900 seconds), with the exception of the altint model variant, for which the average computational effort required is much lower. This result
corresponds with the number of instances for which BARON terminated early for
each model variant; for the altint model variant, BARON only terminated early on
15 of the 30 instances, whereas it terminated early on at least 29 of the 30 instances
for every other model variant. The altint model variant finds a solution faster than
the other model variants but at the slight expense of solution quality. In contrast,
BARON terminated early for the other model variants quite often, but the solutions
found are of high quality. Another notable result is that BARON terminated early
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on all 30 instances for model variants that include the alternative constraints for
detection.
Overall, model variants achieved objective function values that were nearly identical, but both the relative optimality gaps and computational effort required differed
across model variants as the scenario feature levels increased in magnitude. The relative optimality gaps, required computational effort, and the number of instances
terminated due to the limit on run time increased as the scenario feature levels increased. A common pattern across scenarios is that the altint model variant performed
better with respect to the computational effort required and worse with respect to
relative gap obtained. Another important pattern is that the model variants that included the variable bounding performed well in all scenarios with respect to relative
optimality gap. The time limit of 900 seconds was not relevant in the LFL scenario,
but it became more relevant in the MFL and HFL scenarios. It is important to note
that even though BARON may terminate early on a high number of instances for a
particular model variant, it does not mean that it obtained poor objective function
values. Overall, the default, default-b, altdet-b, and altint-b model variants are identified as higher-quality model variants across these baseline scenarios due to having
both a high average objective function value and a low average relative optimality gap
over the set of three baseline scenarios. Even when these model variants had a high
number of instances terminate early (e.g., in the HFL scenario), they still achieved
the low relative optimality gaps and high objective function values. These five model
variants are examined further in Section 2.3.2.

Insights from Early Model Convergence
The commercial solver BARON terminated prematurely for the majority of HFL
instances for each model variant, and it likewise terminated due to the imposed time
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limit for all HFL instances for a majority of model variants. As such, it is of interest
to examine the degree to which the model variants enabled early vis-á-vis terminal
solution quality.
Table 7 describes the average quality, in terms of average reported objective function value, for the first and last solutions found by BARON for the model variants in
the HFL scenario. Informing the second column of Table 7, the root node objective
function value corresponds to the solution found by BARON at the first node in its
branch-and-bound sequence; it provides a lower bound upon which the solver seeks
improvement over the 900 second time limit allowed for each instance. In the third
column of Table 7, the terminal objective function values are the same ones reported
in Table 6; the entries denote the average objective function value that BARON
reported upon termination, whether due to reaching the allotted time limit or by
identifying a global optimal solution.
Table 7. RAIDI Model Variant Performance (Means and Standard Deviations) for
Terminal Objective Function Value and Root Node Objective Function Value over 30
Synthetic Instances of the HFL Scenario

Model
default
default-b
altdet
altdet-b
altint
altint-b
altdetint
altdetint-b

Root Node
Obj. Fn. Val.
0.984 ± 0.013
0.985 ± 0.013
0.985 ± 0.012
0.986 ± 0.012
0.990 ± 0.010
0.990 ± 0.011
0.990 ± 0.010
0.991 ± 0.009

Terminal
Obj. Fn. Val.
0.990 ± 0.011
0.990 ± 0.010
0.990 ± 0.010
0.991 ± 0.009
0.990 ± 0.010
0.991 ± 0.009
0.991 ± 0.009
0.991 ± 0.009

The results shown in Table 7 indicate the model variants using alternative constraints for interdiction have average objective function values that do not improve
much at all as BARON runs longer, whereas each of the other four model variants’ performance improves noticeably over time. That is, the model variants altint,
altint-b, altdetint, and altdetint-b provide slightly higher quality solutions early during
BARON’s solution methodology. Since the model variants default, default-b, altdet-b,
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and altint-b were recommended as higher-quality model variants in Section 2.3.2, and
Table 7 reinforces that these models are still of high quality with respect to root node
solutions, these are the recommended model variants to be explored hereafter.

2.3.3

RAIDI Scenario Feature Examination

Given the superlative performance of the RAIDI model variants default, default-b,
altdet-b and altint-b in Section 2.3.2, herein we test the effects of different scenario
features on the efficacy and efficiency of BARON for solving RAIDI problem instances.
A full factorial experiment on the different feature levels presented in Table 2 to
determine which problem features are most influential to the RAIDI problem would require examining 35 = 243 unique scenarios (with multiple instances for each scenario).
The model parameters N , D, J , I, and K are the five factors. Such an endeavor is
computationally expensive, if not prohibitive; therefore, a fractional factorial design
is preferable to garner useful insights with lesser computational effort. A full factorial design has no aliasing between factor combinations; in contrast, the effects of
higher-order interactions between problem features is elusive when examining a fractional factorial design. However, either is preferable to one-factor-at-a-time (OFAT)
analyses for the greater insights that can be obtained.
5−2
The fractional factorial experiment used herein is a 3III
design with 30 trials in

each treatment combination as depicted in each of Tables 8-11. This experiment
is conducted for each of the model variants default, default-b, altdet-b, and altint-b,
collectively chosen for their relatively superior performance in Section 2.3.2. The primary response variable of interest is the relative optimality gap (%) achieved within
the 15-minute time limit, whereas the second response variable is the required computational effort, subject to the same upper bound. Tables 8-10 report both the
average and standard deviation for each of these response variables, for each treat-
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ment combination within the experiment, computed over 30 trials. For each of the
three mathematical programming formulation variants, two regression models are developed – one for each response variable – to garner greater insights via an exploration
individual and combined effects.
Table 8. Treatment Levels and Relative Optimality Gap Metrics (Mean and Standard
Deviation) - default Model Variant

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

N
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Factors
D J I
2 12 2
2 16 3
2 20 4
3 12 3
3 16 4
3 20 2
4 12 4
4 16 2
4 20 3
2 12 3
2 16 4
2 20 2
3 12 4
3 16 2
3 20 3
4 12 2
4 16 3
4 20 4
2 12 4
2 16 2
2 20 3
3 12 2
3 16 3
3 20 4
4 12 3
4 16 4
4 20 2

K
6
6
6
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
10
10
10
10
10
10
8
8
8
6
6
6

Relative
Gap (%)
0.000 ± 0.000
0.007 ± 0.018
0.006 ± 0.017
0.003 ± 0.011
0.004 ± 0.012
0.003 ± 0.008
0.005 ± 0.016
0.005 ± 0.011
0.014 ± 0.011
0.002 ± 0.009
0.009 ± 0.016
0.007 ± 0.008
0.011 ± 0.015
0.006 ± 0.009
0.008 ± 0.010
0.007 ± 0.010
0.007 ± 0.013
0.007 ± 0.007
0.008 ± 0.014
0.004 ± 0.008
0.004 ± 0.006
0.004 ± 0.007
0.005 ± 0.008
0.005 ± 0.009
0.009 ± 0.013
0.008 ± 0.010
0.007 ± 0.007

Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
0.843 ± 0.921
146.223 ± 324.842
200.860 ± 364.287
98.732 ± 247.415
131.411 ± 307.137
151.971 ± 336.498
122.275 ± 281.447
182.823 ± 360.520
724.639 ± 360.539
266.818 ± 338.228
629.090 ± 412.902
629.803 ± 414.645
686.517 ± 368.972
408.144 ± 429.615
606.524 ± 417.374
702.288 ± 356.076
733.427 ± 365.907
906.841 ± 13.588
825.638 ± 239.568
801.153 ± 272.499
925.267 ± 21.824
768.663 ± 313.157
921.277 ± 24.706
935.088 ± 20.213
885.132 ± 163.099
905.427 ± 169.272
857.212 ± 228.591

Table 12 presents the feature coefficients corresponding to each of two standard
least squares (SLS) regression models (i.e., one for each of the two responses) for
the respective data summarized in Table 8. For the relative optimality gap response,
only D and I were significant factors. This outcome indicates that only the number
of types of detection and interdiction resources, respectively, are significant predictors of the relative optimality gap. For the required computational effort response,
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Table 9. Treatment Levels and Relative Optimality Gap Metrics (Mean and Standard
Deviation) - default-b Model Variant

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

N
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Factors
D J I
2 12 2
2 16 3
2 20 4
3 12 3
3 16 4
3 20 2
4 12 4
4 16 2
4 20 3
2 12 3
2 16 4
2 20 2
3 12 4
3 16 2
3 20 3
4 12 2
4 16 3
4 20 4
2 12 4
2 16 2
2 20 3
3 12 2
3 16 3
3 20 4
4 12 3
4 16 4
4 20 2

K
6
6
6
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
10
10
10
10
10
10
8
8
8
6
6
6

Relative
Gap (%)
0.000 ± 0.000
0.007 ± 0.019
0.007 ± 0.015
0.005 ± 0.012
0.006 ± 0.014
0.002 ± 0.005
0.008 ± 0.015
0.002 ± 0.007
0.018 ± 0.015
0.001 ± 0.003
0.007 ± 0.014
0.004 ± 0.007
0.010 ± 0.014
0.008 ± 0.010
0.011 ± 0.009
0.006 ± 0.011
0.007 ± 0.012
0.007 ± 0.007
0.007 ± 0.014
0.004 ± 0.009
0.003 ± 0.006
0.004 ± 0.008
0.004 ± 0.008
0.005 ± 0.009
0.009 ± 0.013
0.008 ± 0.010
0.006 ± 0.006
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Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
0.606 ± 0.505
121.138 ± 306.765
208.996 ± 365.032
162.788 ± 340.757
212.016 ± 381.700
142.214 ± 318.971
220.054 ± 381.469
147.795 ± 310.475
754.672 ± 336.486
175.213 ± 306.946
480.915 ± 429.437
432.141 ± 438.654
586.550 ± 407.299
550.945 ± 422.964
842.138 ± 223.983
642.040 ± 371.868
822.627 ± 272.632
906.627 ± 14.334
855.459 ± 195.352
812.452 ± 232.288
925.904 ± 22.789
681.418 ± 382.602
890.671 ± 164.932
932.129 ± 19.226
865.085 ± 194.279
904.935 ± 169.255
858.293 ± 228.813

Table 10. Treatment Levels and Relative Optimality Gap Metrics (Mean and Standard
Deviation) - altdet-b Model Variant

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

N
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Factors
D J I
2 12 2
2 16 3
2 20 4
3 12 3
3 16 4
3 20 2
4 12 4
4 16 2
4 20 3
2 12 3
2 16 4
2 20 2
3 12 4
3 16 2
3 20 3
4 12 2
4 16 3
4 20 4
2 12 4
2 16 2
2 20 3
3 12 2
3 16 3
3 20 4
4 12 3
4 16 4
4 20 2

K
6
6
6
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
10
10
10
10
10
10
8
8
8
6
6
6

Relative
Gap (%)
0.000 ± 0.000
0.000 ± 0.000
0.004 ± 0.012
0.003 ± 0.011
0.003 ± 0.010
0.002 ± 0.007
0.006 ± 0.015
0.008 ± 0.015
0.013 ± 0.018
0.000 ± 0.000
0.006 ± 0.015
0.001 ± 0.002
0.008 ± 0.014
0.006 ± 0.009
0.011 ± 0.010
0.005 ± 0.013
0.008 ± 0.012
0.007 ± 0.007
0.005 ± 0.012
0.001 ± 0.001
0.003 ± 0.005
0.004 ± 0.009
0.004 ± 0.008
0.005 ± 0.009
0.008 ± 0.013
0.007 ± 0.009
0.005 ± 0.005
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Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
0.610 ± 0.616
43.488 ± 123.951
207.874 ± 322.127
157.088 ± 279.502
622.626 ± 352.349
671.558 ± 353.811
647.802 ± 306.568
886.947 ± 95.039
819.566 ± 260.331
25.318 ± 59.210
347.192 ± 404.525
245.071 ± 361.482
533.362 ± 380.427
590.541 ± 374.052
827.984 ± 199.184
573.218 ± 342.702
913.665 ± 17.731
906.601 ± 13.839
574.409 ± 352.286
553.374 ± 380.002
808.234 ± 282.980
606.436 ± 377.640
919.060 ± 24.276
933.915 ± 20.225
736.235 ± 304.141
935.999 ± 21.709
918.517 ± 18.751

Table 11. Treatment Levels and Relative Optimality Gap Metrics (Mean and Standard
Deviation) - altint-b Model Variant

Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

N
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Factors
D J I
2 12 2
2 16 3
2 20 4
3 12 3
3 16 4
3 20 2
4 12 4
4 16 2
4 20 3
2 12 3
2 16 4
2 20 2
3 12 4
3 16 2
3 20 3
4 12 2
4 16 3
4 20 4
2 12 4
2 16 2
2 20 3
3 12 2
3 16 3
3 20 4
4 12 3
4 16 4
4 20 2

K
6
6
6
10
10
10
8
8
8
8
8
8
6
6
6
10
10
10
10
10
10
8
8
8
6
6
6

Relative
Gap (%)
0.000 ± 0.000
0.000 ± 0.000
0.003 ± 0.015
0.001 ± 0.002
0.003 ± 0.011
0.007 ± 0.010
0.006 ± 0.011
0.007 ± 0.010
0.010 ± 0.012
0.000 ± 0.002
0.005 ± 0.015
0.005 ± 0.005
0.003 ± 0.004
0.009 ± 0.011
0.007 ± 0.007
0.005 ± 0.010
0.004 ± 0.005
0.003 ± 0.005
0.003 ± 0.011
0.003 ± 0.007
0.002 ± 0.004
0.003 ± 0.004
0.002 ± 0.007
0.002 ± 0.006
0.005 ± 0.007
0.004 ± 0.006
0.006 ± 0.007

Req’d Comp.
Effort (sec)
0.903 ± 1.681
68.852 ± 176.649
74.916 ± 231.779
70.736 ± 227.376
156.538 ± 302.386
362.492 ± 438.878
334.629 ± 430.462
471.976 ± 440.406
565.953 ± 414.857
133.974 ± 233.585
574.707 ± 407.565
641.559 ± 392.923
616.691 ± 395.580
764.026 ± 309.313
870.058 ± 161.228
743.093 ± 325.828
842.304 ± 216.073
785.997 ± 265.275
693.944 ± 348.971
834.082 ± 217.443
900.021 ± 0.007
806.637 ± 245.533
873.805 ± 141.187
899.970 ± 0.156
869.986 ± 161.407
900.001 ± 0.012
870.054 ± 160.962

Table 12. Standard Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates for Relative Optimality Gap and Req. Comp. Effort Responses - default Model Variant
Term
N
D
J
I
K

Estimate
0.00035
0.00116
0.00017
0.00111
-0.00040

Relative Gap (%)
Std Error t Ratio
0.00049
0.70
0.00049
2.35
0.00012
1.36
0.00049
2.26
0.00025
-1.61

Prob> |t|
0.4822
0.0190
0.1727
0.0241
0.1088
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Req’d Comp. Effort (sec)
Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> |t|
336.94898
13.78550
24.44
<.0001
88.57609
13.78550
6.43
<.0001
21.96248
3.44638
6.37
<.0001
46.68033
13.78550
3.39
0.0007
16.10684
6.89275
2.34
0.0197

every factor is significant in the regression model, with a positive regression coefficient. As expected, increasing the scenario feature levels leads to a higher required
computational effort. Most notably, N has the largest coefficient; an increase in the
number of stages will most rapidly increase the required computational effort when
using the default model variant to solve RAIDI scenario instances. In addition to the
SLS regression models described by Table 12, another regression model that included
two-factor interactions was constructed for each response. Although not reported
here for the sake of brevity, the N × D was a significant factor in the relative gap response model, and most of the two-factor interactions were significant in the required
computational effort response model, indicating the sensitivity of the latter response
to all features.
Table 13. Standard Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates for Relative Optimality Gap and Req. Comp. Effort Responses - default-b Model Variant
Term
N
D
J
I
K

Estimate
-0.00019
0.00161
0.00017
0.00162
-0.00049

Relative Gap (%)
Std Error t Ratio
0.00049
-0.39
0.00049
3.30
0.00012
1.43
0.00049
3.34
0.00024
-2.02

Prob> |t|
0.6979
0.0010
0.1538
0.0009
0.0439

Req’d Comp. Effort (sec)
Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> |t|
319.78156
13.81994
23.14
<.0001
117.18359
13.81994
8.48
<.0001
25.19310
3.45499
7.29
<.0001
57.76532
13.81994
4.18
<.0001
15.09557
6.90997
2.18
0.0292

Table 13 reports the results attained when fitting two SLS models to the defaultb data that is summarized in Table 9. Similarly to the default model variant, the
results for the relative optimality gap response show that D and I are the significant
predictors and that every factor is significant for the required computational effort
response. Moreover, for the required computational effort response, N has by far
the highest regression coefficient. Indicated is that an increase in the number of
stages correlates to an increase in the required computational effort for the defaultb model variant to solve a RAIDI scenario instance. In addition to the modeling
results in Table 13, additional regression models including two-factor interactions
were also constructed for each response. None of the two-factor interactions were
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significant in the relative gap response model, but most of the two-factor interactions
were significant in the required computational effort response model.
Table 14. Standard Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates for Relative Optimality Gap and Req. Comp. Effort Responses - altdet-b Model Variant
Term
N
D
J
I
K

Estimate
0.00018
0.00264
0.00016
0.00111
-0.00034

Relative Gap (%)
Std Error t Ratio
0.00045
0.41
0.00045
5.91
0.00011
1.47
0.00045
2.48
0.00022
-1.54

Prob> |t|
0.6813
<.0001
0.1411
0.0133
0.1251

Req’d Comp. Effort (sec)
Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> |t|
162.70111
12.66573
12.85
<.0001
251.83217
12.66573
19.88
<.0001
34.51169
3.16643
10.90
<.0001
36.86161
12.66573
2.91
0.0037
27.39340
6.33287
4.33
<.0001

Table 14 presents the results attained when fitting two SLS models to the altdet-b
data that is summarized in Table 10. These results likewise show that D and I are
significant factors in the SLS regression model for the relative optimality gap response.
Every factor is significant in the regression model for the required computational
effort response. One difference for the altdet-b model variant is that D has the highest
regression coefficient estimate for the required computational effort response, whereas
N has the highest regression coefficient for the other model variants, even though it
is still second highest for the default-b model variant.
Table 15. Standard Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates for Relative Optimality Gap and Req. Comp. Effort Responses - altint-b Model Variant
Term
N
D
J
I
K

Estimate
-0.00041
0.00169
0.00025
-0.00060
-0.00016

Relative Gap (%)
Std Error t Ratio
0.00036
-1.14
0.00036
4.71
0.00009
2.82
0.00036
-1.66
0.00018
-0.89

Prob> |t|
0.2552
<.0001
0.0050
0.0975
0.3731

Req’d Comp. Effort (sec)
Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob> |t|
307.86141
13.11231
23.48
<.0001
136.72409
13.11231
10.43
<.0001
23.61705
3.27808
7.20
<.0001
-25.41281
13.11231
-1.94
0.053
9.82555
6.55616
1.50
0.1344

Table 15 presents the results attained when fitting two SLS models to the altint-b
data that is summarized in Table 11. These results show that D and J are significant
factors in the SLS regression model for the relative optimality gap response. Only
N , D, J are significant in the regression model for the required computational effort
response. Similar to the other model variants’ SLS regression models, N and D have
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the highest regression coefficient estimates for the required computational effort response. Similar to the methodology for the other three higher-quality model variants,
another regression model that included two-factor interactions was constructed for
each response. The collective results were almost identical to those of the default
model variant.
In summary, the results shown in Tables 12-15 indicate that subdividing a defender’s area into more stages will likely result in a higher required computational
effort. Since the defender only uses one interdiction resource per stage, such a decomposition into a greater number of stages yields more opportunities for a defender’s
assets to interdict an intruder, and so a natural tradespace exists. Whereas the number of stages is significant in each of the three required computational effort regression
models, the other four main effects are significant as well. Thus, increasing the size of
any scenario feature will likely lead to an increase in the computational effort required
to solve it. Second, the results show that D and I are usually significant predictors to
the relative optimality gap response, depending on the model variant employed. That
is, the more types of assets that the defender is able to place, the better each of the
three model variants perform with respect to the relative optimality gap achieved.

2.4

Conclusions
Given two respective sets of detection resources and interdiction resources, each

having different types of resources with heterogeneous capabilities, this research addresses the problem of locating and allocating them over a sequence of spatiallydefined stages to effectively detect and intercept an intruder. We set forth a mixedinteger nonlinear mathematical programming model – and seven alternative variants
– to address the underlying problem using a leading commercial solver for global
optimization.
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For the Resource Allocation for Intruder Detection and Interdiction (RAIDI)
model variants, this work formalizes the definition of problem scenarios as they relate
to key parameters relating to instance size with the intent of determining the relative effectiveness of model variants to attain high-quality solutions quickly to RAIDI
scenario instances. Development of the model variants allows for a structural examination of scenarios of many different sizes, and which enables a study to identify
which factors in the RAIDI scenarios influence the solution quality found by the
model variants.
We first use three baseline scenarios to determine which of the eight model variants are of high quality as indicated by the relative optimality gaps achieved and
computational effort required to solve instances, and the ones that are deemed ineffective are set aside. The model variants of higher quality are examined further
by using a fractional factorial design to fit simple linear regression (SLS) regression
models to two responses: relative optimality gap and required computational effort.
The main effects in these regression models are simply the feature levels in the RAIDI
scenarios. Testing results identified that the number of types of detection and interdiction resources are the significant factors in determining the relative optimality gap
obtained by the model variants, and that every feature level is a significant factor
in determining the computational effort required to solve an instance of a RAIDI
scenario.
After examining the results of both the baseline scenario metrics and the fractional factorial experiments for the higher-quality model variants, it is useful to note
that there is a natural tradespace between solution quality (measured by relative optimality gap obtained) and the computational effort required to solve an instance.
Generally speaking, the better a model variant performs when solving an instance in
one of those two metrics, the worse it performs in the other. Another finding shows
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that when the number of stages in a scenario is increased, there is a significant increase
in the computational effort required for a model variant to solve the scenario instance.
Last, results in Section 2.3.3 show that both the number of detection asset types, D,
and interdiction asset types, I, are statistically significant to the relative optimality
gap response obtained by the model variants to solve RAIDI scenario instances.
The superlative RAIDI model variant identified via two phases of empirical testing is the default-b model, which augments the default model with simple upper and
lower bounds on each of the probability calculations to enhance the performance of
the commercial solver’s branch-and-bound procedure. This model variant performed
extremely well across all scenario sizes with respect to both of the responses measured. Moreover, the results of fitting two SLS regression models (i.e., one each for
the relative optimality gap response and the required computational effort response)
show that D and I are very significant predictors of the relative optimality gap, especially D. These outcomes, combined with the relatively low standard deviations for
both relative optimality gap obtained and computational effort required when solving 30 randomly generated instances each for 27 different RAIDI scenarios, indicate
that the default-b model variant performs consistently across many differently-sized
RAIDI scenarios and is worthy of use when considering more complicated modeling
frameworks in a sequel to this work. It is clear that this model variant is no different
than the others in the sense that there is a clear trade off between solution quality
and the computational effort required to solve an instance of a RAIDI scenario, but
the benefits mentioned above are unique to the default-b model variant.
There are multiple areas of future research for this problem thread. Regarding
the intruder, introducing the concept of multiple intruder paths would create several
possibilities for further study in contrast to the single intruder path studied herein.
First, there may exist uncertainty regarding where a single intruder will travel, given
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a set of possible intruder paths. This new problem may be addressed via robust
optimization or stochastic programming, depending on the information available to
the decision maker. Second, a problem that introduces uncertainty about the paths
over which multiple intruders will travel has merit for study. In either case, a refined
version of the RAIDI model can be used, and the superlative RAIDI model variant
identified herein provides a foundational framework for modeling such interactions.
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III. The Weighted Intruder Path Covering Problem

3.1

Introduction
Nations, states, and territories must protect their sovereignty against would-be

intruders, and that protection often entails the location and use of disparate resources
to detect and intercept those intruders. One such problem is ballistic missile defense
(BMD), wherein a defender must array sets of radars and interceptors to defend
cities (i.e., population centers) against an adversary’s launch of ballistic missiles.
Other problems such as border protection, the interdiction of refugee movement,
cybersecurity, and even the prevention of spread by natural biological immune systems
are likewise characterized by similar objectives, resource-outcome relationships, and
constraints. Each of these motivating scenarios entails a defender emplacing fixed
detection and interdiction resources and an intruder or multiple intruders attempting
to traverse the spatial region via a set of paths, where the path used may be unknown
to the defender. As it relates to a BMD scenario, intruder missiles seek to destroy high
value assets (HVAs) in the defender’s territory. In the refugee and border protection
scenario, refugees seek safe havens and resources such as shelter and water within
the territory of the defender (Mahecic, 2020). In the cybersecurity scenario, a hacker
may attempt to steal sensitive user data from a server within a computer network
(Schlesinger and Solomon, 2020). In the immune system scenario, an infection may
attempt to spread to attack vital organs via the bloodstream (O’Connell and Cafasso,
2018). Moreover, an enterprise modeling approach for defensive asset location is
worth examination; subject to the tractability of solution methods, it is preferable
to a “systems of systems” approach that decomposes the enterprise and inherently
tolerates assumed suboptimality of solutions. An enterprise model to identify the
appropriate use of disparate resources to detect and intercept intruders with unknown
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path(s) for intrusion has merit for a variety of applications.
In a preceding work to this study, Haywood et al. (2020) examined a related problem wherein a single intruder attempts to traverse a region partitioned by the defender
into physical stages (i.e., subregions). In each stage, the defender can place limited
detection and interdiction resources to intercept an intruder traveling on a predetermined path. This research extends the previous work, both with respect to modeling
and solution methodology. From a modeling perspective, it improves the level of
fidelity in three aspects: 1) adopting a multi-objective optimization framework that
accounts for the cost of resources used by a defender, 2) introducing uncertainty regarding which path(s) intruder(s) will traverse, and 3) modeling the ability of selected
defensive resources to serve the dual-purpose of both detecting and interdicting intruders. Haywood et al. (2020) addressed the cost of the limited resources by making
the higher-quality detection and interdiction resources less plentiful for the defender’s
use. This research seeks to introduce a cost objective for detection and interdiction resources and more thoroughly investigate the tradespace between cost and effectiveness
for various defense configurations. Haywood et al. (2020) did not address the concept
of intruder path uncertainty, and this research attempts to address it by also seeking,
as an objective, to minimize the maximum expected damage over any of the intruder
paths under consideration. For the resulting mixed-integer, nonlinear programming
formulation this research tests selected metaheuristics designed for multi-objective
optimization vis-à-vis a leading commercial solver for global optimization, the latter
of which we demonstrate has limited efficacy for solving instances of the underlying
problem.
The motivating scenarios illustrate a need to examine the uncertainty in the path
an intruder will traverse. In the BMD scenario, a realistic view is that the actual
path of an intruder missile is unknown, but there are some paths are more likely to
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be traversed than others. In the border scenario, the actual path refugees may take is
unknown, but historical data may indicate more commonly traveled paths and inform
probabilities with which each path may be used. In the cybersecurity scenario, many
firewalls may be in place, but the actual path an intruder may attempt to use when
breaching the servers is unknown. In an immune system, an infection will generally
travel along the path of least resistance but, if there are multiple avenues of least
resistance, then the path is not known with certainty. Figure 4 in Section 3.3.2
provides a graphical depiction of a representative spatial relationship between stages,
intruder paths, and possible locations for detection assets, interdiction assets, or dualpurpose assets; the notation therein will be formally defined in Section 3.2.
In each of these different scenarios, a multi-objective optimization approach is appropriate; there is a natural trade-space to examine between the cost and performance
of an enterprise. For the aforementioned motivating problems and their structural
similarities, this research seeks to address the following problem:
Given an intruder attempting to traverse a spatially-decomposed region via multiple possible paths, effectively and cost-efficiently identify a defensive strategy
that locates sets of detection resources and interdiction resources, each of which
has different types of resources that vary by cost and capability.
Within the context of the related literature, this research makes two contributions. In its first contribution to address the underlying problem, this research sets
forth a mathematical programming model having several collectively complicating aspects that differentiate it from other research in the literature, as reviewed in Section
3.1.1. The model addresses the location of assets across an enterprise comprised of
different asset types (i.e., detection and interdiction assets) and capabilities, including dual-purpose assets representing actual assets for certain motivating scenarios
(e.g., AEGIS class destroyers in a BMD scenario). The enterprise approach of the
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model considers the location of these assets in a defender’s territory organized into
multiple stages, better representing the geographic boundaries often used to organize
defenses for related applications (e.g., border patrol). Finally, the model employs
a multi-objective approach to enable the examination of the tradeoffs between the
effectiveness and cost of defensive asset configurations. In its second contribution,
this research identifies and empirically tests alternative, conceptually sound solution
methodologies for instances of the underlying problem. Empirical testing first identifies the instance size-specific limitations of a leading commercial, global optimization
solver, motivating the examination of metaheuristics. Subsequent testing compares
the relative efficacy of two metaheuristics for solving larger-sized instances, identifying
the superlative technique that provides practical utility to the relevant mathematical
programming model presented in the first contribution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.1.1 reviews the
relevant literature to the application of interest, as well as the literature that informs
either the modeling approach or solution methodologies examined herein. Section 3.2
presents the mathematical programming formulation, and Section 3.3 validates the
model for an illustrative instance and conducts the aforementioned empirical testing.
Section 3.4 concludes the paper with a summary of resulting insights and suggestions
for future research.

3.1.1

Literature Review

Although the published literature does not address the underlying problem examined herein, it does both inform our modeling approach and provide alternative,
candidate solution methodologies that we consider and empirically test.
Several related modeling techniques from the literature provide insight, yet none
we identified embraces the complexity of the problem examined in this research. On
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a superficial level, most resource location problems emplace a single asset type to address a particular demand (e.g., Bell et al. (2011), Basciftci et al. (2021)). Even works
that emplace multiple asset types (e.g., Serafino and Ventre (2016), Paul et al. (2017))
typically consider each asset type to have homogenous capabilities, whereas the problem studied herein allows a defender to emplace multiple asset types – with each type
having a range of specific asset capabilities – and with asset types contributing differently to the objective of interdicting an intruder. Moreover, this research utilizes
an enterprise model in which the stated goal is to detect and subsequently interdict
an intruder using dedicated assets for each task and over all potential intruder paths
and multiple stages. The complexity embraced by this modeling endeavor improves
upon the literature that considers a single intruder path and/or stage (e.g., Hausken
(2010), Karabulut et al. (2017), Lessin et al. (2019)).
Path covering research is a literature thread more closely related to the motivation for this research, wherein a user seeks to emplace facilities that cover paths or
routes rather than fixed-point demands. In one such example, Capar et al. (2013)
examined the Flow-Refueling Location Model (FRLM) to locate alternative-fuel station locations for use by vehicles along their routes. In related extensions, Upchurch
et al. (2009) considered a capacitated variant of the problem, and Capar et al. (2013)
studied heuristic solution methods. An abundance of literature pertaining to similar
applications (e.g., vehicle recharging stations, aircraft refueling locations) exists, but
it typically considers vehicle ranges and adopts a cooperative approach for facility
location. Moreover, the research herein differs in complexity from traditional path
covering problems due to the path of an intruder being decomposed into multiple
stages as opposed to a single path. As such, this literature motivates but does not
directly inform the research herein; it is more strongly informed by traditional facility
location models.
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Given this work seeks to defend (i.e., cover) numerous intruder paths with a (cost)limited number of resources, both the Maximal Covering Location Problem (MCLP)
and the Maximal Expected Covering Location Problem (MEXCLP) provide useful
modeling perspectives. Church and ReVelle (1974) introduced the MCLP, which
seeks to cover the maximum amount of demands, subject to bounds on the number (or
cost) of emplaced facilities, wherein coverage of a demand is a binary characterization.
Daskin (1983) extended the MCLP via the MEXCLP modeling framework, wherein
each resource has a probability of being busy (i.e., unable to provide coverage), and
the expected coverage of demands is maximized. A reader interested in the greater
context of location theory would benefit from examining works by Daskin (2011) and
Church and Murray (2018). Of relevance to this research is the general MEXCLP
framework that considers probabilities of coverage and the expected coverage attained
across the enterprise of resource emplacement. An interesting optimization problem
that allocates rectangular strips across a rectangular region is studied by Hu et al.
(2021), an example of a coverage problem wherein a user locates assets to cover a
spatial demand rather than traditional point-based demands. In comparison, the
research herein seeks to provide coverage to paths rather than point demands via
located resources.
Regarding solution methodologies utilized herein pertaining to multi-objective
optimization, this research considers both the effectiveness of system performance and
the efficient use of limited resources. There are two different frameworks for multiobjective optimization regarding the preferences of a decision-maker over objectives:
a priori and a posteriori (Marler and Arora, 2004). An a priori framework entails
a decision-maker articulation of priorities before identifying a solution, and only one
Pareto optimal solution need be identified. Alternatively, an a posteriori framework
identifies the set (or a subset) of Pareto solutions, characterizing the tradespace for a
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decision maker to consider and possibly discriminating among the solutions to develop
a recommendation (e.g., via proximity to an ideal point) (Marler and Arora, 2004).
Given the potential benefit of deriving insights attainable by examining the tradeoffs
between across a Pareto front, this research embraces an a posteriori framework.
Among the methods used to identify Pareto optimal solutions to multi-objective
optimization problems are the Weighted Sum Method, the ε-constraint Method, compromise programming (i.e., a method of weighted metrics), and scalarizing functions
(Ehrgott (2005); Deb (2014)). The literature in the field of multi-objective optimization is vast, and we recommend the works by Deb (2001), Marler and Arora (2004),
and Ehrgott (2005) for an interested reader. When solving multi-objective optimization models that are computationally challenging, the precise identification of Pareto
optimal solutions may be challenging to traditional optimization methods, motivating
the use of metaheuristics. Gonzalez et al. (2020) explored the use of a simulation algorithm to solve multi-objective optimization problems instead of a global solver, with
mixed results. Talbi et al. (2012) review this developing area of the multi-objective
optimization literature, including the use of both non-evolutionary approaches (e.g.,
local search, Simulated Annealing, Tabu Search) as well as hybrid metaheuristics
(e.g., Multi-objective Genetic Local Search).
This work solves instances of the problem using selected variants of a class of
metaheuristics known as genetic algorithms (GA). Holland et al. (1975) pioneered
GA development, embedding concepts from nature and evolutionary processes. For
the purpose of multi-objective optimization (MOO), many variations of GAs have
been developed to explore Pareto fronts. Two noteworthy algorithmic components
developed within the MOO GA research thread are elitism and the use of an external
population. Elitism ranks population members by fitness level and ensures the most
fit members survive to the next generation, and it is employed in notable works by
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Murata and Ishibuchi (1995) and Deb et al. (2002). Murata and Ishibuchi (1995)
invented the MOO GA that randomly assigns weights to each objective function for
each population member in an effort to more thoroughly explore the Pareto front,
addressing the shortcoming they identified with other MOO GAs. Adopting the
naming convention used by Konak et al. (2006), the algorithm developed by Murata
and Ishibuchi (1995) will hereafter be referred to as the Random Weight Genetic
Algorithm (RWGA). In another major development, Srinivas and Deb (1994) created
the Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA), which does not use elitism
but instead simply makes use of fitness sharing via niching to generate diversity among
subsequent populations. Deb et al. (2002) improved upon this algorithm in creating
NSGA-II, which is widely considered to be one of, if not the, best MOO GAs in
the literature. NSGA-II has success beyond traditional use, as evidenced in research
by (Rabbani et al., 2019), wherein the authors used it in conjunction with Monte
Carlo simulation to create a simheuristic to solve MINLP models. Similarly, research
conducted by Drake et al. (2020) employs NSGA-II as one of several metaheuristics
to solve a multi-objective optimization problem involving deployment of resources for
infrastructure networks, and NSGA-II emerges as the best of the tested MOO GAs.
Traditionally, NSGA-II uses elitism when iterating through generations and, as the
name suggests, assigns fitness values via the use of rankings by examining whether
a solution in the population is dominated. The second major component, the use
of external populations, consists of maintaining a distinct, secondary population and
introducing members of it to the main population when creating the subsequent
generation. This concept is observable in RWGA (Murata and Ishibuchi, 1995); the
algorithm maintains a separate population consisting of solutions heretofore identified
as Pareto optimal and introduces a subset of them to the next generation. For a
detailed comparisons between various MOO GAs, we refer an interested reader to
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comprehensive surveys by Zitzler et al. (2000) and Konak et al. (2006).
Within this research, we apply and compare both the RWGA and NSGA-II multiobjective GAs. We selected these metaheuristics due to the persistently high performance each method has exhibited when tested on various problems, both within the
literature and during preliminary testing on instances of the underlying problem for
this research, and because they are quite different in the mechanisms employed for
diversity, elitism, use of external populations, and fitness assignment.

3.2

Model and Solution Methodology
First, we develop a model of the problem in which a single intruder attempts to

traverse the stages of a defensive region where the intruder’s path is unknown but is
limited to a finite set of possible paths. Moreover, this model is initially tri-objective,
with the objectives respectively seeking to 1) minimize the expected damage caused
by the intruder, 2) minimize the maximum expected damage done by the intruder,
and 3) minimize the cost of the defense configuration.
To formulate the mathematical program to address the underlying problem, it is
necessary to define the following sets, parameters, and decision variables.
Sets
• P = {1, 2, ..., P} is the set of paths over which the intruder may traverse through
the defender’s territory, indexed by ψ.
• N = {1, 2, ..., N } is the set of distinguishable stages over which the intruder
may be detected and interdicted by the defender’s enterprise of sensors and
interdictors, indexed by n. (If N = 1, the following models remain valid, but
the indexing of selected sets, parameters, decision variables, and constraints on
n can be set aside.) Relative to the set of stages, two assumptions are made
regarding the intruder’s path. First, we assume that each path transits every
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stage. Second, the stages are numbered in ascending order, as an intruder would
encounter them when traversing any path.
• D = {1, 2, ..., D} is the set of different detection resource types, indexed by d,
each of which pertains to different capabilities (e.g., range, effectiveness).
• J = {1, 2, ..., J } is the set of possible locations at which detection resources can
[
be located, indexed by j. J is partitioned by stage, where
Jn = J.
n∈N

• I = {1, 2, ..., I} is the set of different interdiction resource types, indexed by
i, each of which has different capabilities (e.g., speed, range, probability of
success).
• K = {1, 2, ..., K} is the set of possible locations at which interdiction resources
can be located, indexed by k. Similar to set J, the set K is likewise partitioned
over N .
• B = {1, 2, ..., B} is the set of dual-purpose resource types (i.e., resources that can
both detect and interdict an intruder), indexed by b, each of which pertains to
different capabilities (e.g., speed, range, probability of interdiction, probability
of detection).
• L = {1, 2, ..., L} is the set of possible locations at which dual-purpose resources
can be located, indexed by l. Similar to sets J and K, the set L is likewise
partitioned over N .
Parameters
• vψ : the expected damage that an intruder on path ψ would inflict if not interdicted. As formulated, the math program considers an intruder seeking to
traverse each of the paths ψ ∈ P simultaneously. It may also address a single
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intruder considering which one of the paths to traverse. For such a case, assuming a probability distribution of the intruder over the paths, vψ is the likelihood
the intruder will traverse that path, multiplied by the damage induced if they
successfully traverse it.
• uDd , uIi , uBb : the maximum number of detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose
resources that can be emplaced, respectively of types d, i, and b.
• cDd , cIi , cBb : the cost of emplacing a detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resources, respectively of types d, i, and b.
• pDdjψ : the probability that an intruder on path ψ is detected by a detection
resource of type d emplaced at location j.
• pIikψ : the probability that an intruder on path ψ is interdicted by an interdiction
resource of type i emplaced at location k.
BI
• pBD
blψ , pblψ : the probability that an intruder on path ψ is detected or interdicted,

respectively, by a dual-purpose resource of type b emplaced at location l.
• we , wmax , wc : the relative weights assigned, respectively, to the expected total
damage, the worst-case path-specific damage, and the enterprise cost when
solving an instance of the problem with a commercial solver via the Weighted
Sum Method for MOO
Decision Variables
• xdj : a binary variable equal to 1 if a detection resource of type d is emplaced
at location j, and 0 otherwise.
• yik : a binary variable equal to 1 if an interdiction resource of type i is emplaced
at location k, and 0 otherwise.
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• zbl : a binary variable equal to 1 if a dual-purpose resource of type b is emplaced
at location l, and 0 otherwise.
D
• πψn
: the conditional probability that an intruder on path ψ is detected in stage

n given it has successfully traversed previous stages, i.e., 1, . . . , n − 1.
I
: the conditional probability that an intruder on path ψ is interdicted in
• πψn

stage n given it has successfully traversed previous stages, i.e., 1, . . . , n − 1 and
has been detected in stage n.
D

T

• πψn

I

: the conditional probability of an intruder on path ψ being detected and

subsequently interdicted in stage n given it has successfully traversed previous
stages, i.e., 1, . . . , n − 1.
D

• πψ

T

I

: the probability of an intruder on path ψ being detected and subsequently

interdicted.
• fe : the total expected damage done by the intruder.
• fmax : the worst-case expected damage done by the intruder.
• fc : the cost of the defense configuration employed by the defender.
Leveraging the aforementioned notation, we formulate the Weighted Intruder
Path Covering (WIPC) model as follows.

min (fe , fmax , fc )
T 
X 
D I
s.t. fe =
vψ 1 − πψ
,

(23)
(24)

ψ∈P


T 
D I
fmax ≥ vψ 1 − πψ
,
XX
XX
XX
fc =
cDd xdj +
cIi yik +
cBb zbl ,
d∈D j∈J

i∈I k∈K

b∈B l∈L
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∀ψ ∈ P (25)
(26)

D
πψ

T

I

=1−

Y

1−

T 
D I
πψn ,

∀ ψ ∈ P (27)

n∈N
D

T

πψn
D
πψn

I

I
D
,
∀ ψ ∈ P, n ∈ N, (28)
πψn
= πψn
Y Y
zbl
x Y Y
, ∀ ψ ∈ P, ∀ n ∈ N, (29)
1 − pBD
=1−
1 − pDdjψ dj
blψ
d∈D j∈Jn

X

b∈B l∈Ln

xdj ≤ 1,

∀j ∈ J, (30)

d∈D
I
πψn
=1−

Y Y

1 − pIikψ

yik Y Y

i∈I k∈Kn

XX

yik +

i∈I k∈Kn

X

XX

1 − pBI
blψ

zbl

,

∀ ψ ∈ P, ∀ n ∈ N, (31)

b∈B l∈Ln

zbl ≤ 2,

∀ n ∈ N, (32)

b∈B l∈Ln

xdj ≤ uDd ,

∀d ∈ D, (33)

yik ≤ uIi ,

∀i ∈ I, (34)

zbl ≤ uBb ,

∀b ∈ B, (35)

j∈J

X
k∈K

X
l∈L

xdj ∈ {0, 1},

∀d ∈ D, j ∈ J (36)

yik ∈ {0, 1},

∀i ∈ I, k ∈ K (37)

zbl ∈ {0, 1},

∀b ∈ B, l ∈ L (38)

D
0 ≤ πψn
≤ 1,

∀ ψ ∈ P, ∀ n ∈ N, (39)

I
0 ≤ πψn
≤ 1,

∀ ψ ∈ P, ∀ n ∈ N, (40)

D

T

I

D

T

I

0 ≤ πψn
0 ≤ πψ

≤ 1,

∀ ψ ∈ P, ∀ n ∈ N, (41)

≤ 1,
X
0 ≤ fe ≤
vψ ,

∀ ψ ∈ P, (42)
(43)

ψ∈P

fmax ≤ max{vψ },

(44)

ψ∈P

0 ≤ fc ≤ J · max{cDd } + K · max{cIi } + L · max{cBb },
d

i

b
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(45)

The objective (23) of this formulation minimizes each of three objective functions,
as respectively either calculated or bound via Constraints (24)-(26). Constraint (24)
calculates the expected damage inflicted by intruders over all paths ψ ∈ P . Constraint
(25) bounds the maximum expected damage from below by the expected damage that
will occur on each of the intruder paths ψ ∈ P . Note that, although this model is
initially tri-objective, we later simplify to a bi-objective model after initial testing indicates a high correlation between two of the objectives, as further discussed in Section
3.3.2. Constraint (26) calculates the cost of the emplaced resources. Constraint (27)
calculates the probability of detection-and-interdiction of an intruder on each path
ψ ∈ P using the stage-specific conditional probabilities of detection-and-interdiction,
assuming independence between stages. Constraint (28) computes the stage-specific
conditional probabilities of detection-and-interdiction for an intruder on each path
ψ ∈ P , likewise assuming independence between these probabilities. To calculate
the in-stage probability of detection for an intruder on each of the paths ψ ∈ P ,
it is assumed that every detection resource and dual-purpose resource emplaced in
the stage contributes to the overall in-stage probability of detection. Constraint (29)
leverages this assumption in calculating each path-and-stage-specific probability of
detection as a function of the detection and dual-purpose resources emplaced in stage
n and the respective probabilities specific to each type of resource. Constraint (30)
limits the number of detection resources that can be emplaced at each location j ∈ J
to at most one. To calculate each path-and-stage-specific probability of interdiction
via Constraint (31), a different assumption is made regarding the interdiction and
dual-purpose assets; at most two interdiction or dual-purpose assets in each stage
can be utilized to attempt to interdict an intruder on each path. This assumption is
motivated by the literature for the BMD scenario, which indicates firing more than
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two interceptor missiles is not effective (Wilkening, 2000). Accordingly, Constraint
(32) enforces that at most two interdiction or dual-purpose assets can be utilized for
interdiction on a given intruder path within a stage. Constraints (33)-(35) ensure the
total number of detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resources, respectively, do
not exceed the allotted amount. Constraints (36)-(38) enforce binary restrictions on
selected decision variables, and Constraints (39)-(42) bound each of the computed
probabilities to impose a hypercube of constraints on the related decision variables to
support the application of a global optimization (i.e., branch-and-bound) algorithm
via a commercial solver. For similar reasons, Constraints (43)-(45) enforce lower and
upper bounds on the objective function calculations.
Three solution methods are considered and empirically tested in Section 3.3 to
solve instances of the WIPC. The research first uses the Branch-And-Reduce Optimization Navigator (BARON) (Sahinidis and Tawarmalani, 2004), a commercial,
global solver designed for the global optimal solution of mixed-integer nonlinear programs (MINLPs) such as WIPC. The commercial global optimization solver BARON
was selected from among several alternatives (i.e., Bonmin, COUENNE, LindoGlobal,
and SCIP) based on its superlative performance during preliminary empirical testing for instances of the problem. Additionally, testing examines the multi-objective
genetic algorithms RWGA and NSGA-II, as discussed in Section 3.1.1.

3.3

Testing, Results, and Analysis
Before examining the limitations of the commercial solver BARON, Section 3.3.1

describes the method utilized to stochastically generate parameters for test instances,
and Section 3.3.2 validates the WIPC model for a small, illustrative instance. Section
3.3.3 empirically examines the limitations of the commercial solver BARON and motivates the development and use of a metaheuristic to solve larger instances of WIPC.
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Section 3.3.4 demonstrates the superior effectiveness and efficiency of RWGA and
NSGA-II to BARON. Finally, Section 3.3.5 assesses the effectiveness and efficiency
of RWGA and NSGA-II for larger-sized instances.

3.3.1

Test Instance Generation

To enable a relatively focused testing design, set sizes and selected parameters for
WIPC instances are user-defined and deterministic, with the remainder of parameters stochastically generated based on the aforementioned user-defined values. For a
given test instance, specified are the number of paths P, the number of stages N , and
the respective numbers and types of each defensive resource (i.e., D, J , I, K, B, L).
Although not a direct set or parameter of WIPC, testing also considers a userdetermined size of the defended region; herein, a rectangular region is assumed with
an intruder traversing (w.l.o.g.) from left to right. The rectangular region we consider
has a width of 6400 units and a height of 2300 units, which roughly emulates, from
the perspective of BMD, the aspect ratio and approximate dimensions (in miles) of
a region of interest in the Northern Pacific Ocean. Using this width, the respective
widths of stages are assumed to be uniform (i.e., with each stage width equal to
6400/N ).
For each set of these affixed values, which we hereafter refer to as a scenario, testing considers multiple instances, wherein each instance differs via selected, stochastically generated parameters. In testing throughout Sections 3.3.2- 3.3.4, this research
generates WIPC instances for a given scenario in the following manner. First, instances are generated using a fixed pseudo-random number generation seed in GAMS
for Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, and in R for Section 3.3.4. The allocation of possible
resource locations to stages (i.e., Jn , Kn , and Ln ) are respectively identified with a
discrete uniform distribution with the proviso that at least one location option for
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each category and type of resource exists in each stage. Once the detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resource locations are assigned to stages, their respective
locations within the stages are calculated via a uniform distribution to designate a
two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate. Intruder paths are calculated by assuming
that intruders will traverse the territory in a straight line from an origin (i.e., launch
site) on the left edge of the rectangular region to a destination (i.e., target) on the
right edge of the rectangular region. The vertical coordinate for each of these points
(i.e., on the left or right boundary or the region) for a given path is generated using
a uniform distribution U (0, 2300).
Another parameter generated to create an instance of WIPC are the values of vψ .
These values are sampled randomly from the set of the populations of the 20 most
populated cities on the US West Coast. For example, if P = 7 for an instance of
WIPC, seven numbers are chosen at random (with replacement) from the aforementioned set to generate the vψ -values. The larger population values are interpreted as
larger values of vψ because an intruder targeting a highly populated city is assumed
to have the ability to cause more damage.
When generating specific parameter values, we assume that higher values of the
indicies d, i, and b correspond to more capable detection, interdiction, and dualpurpose resource types, respectively, which are also assumed to be more expensive
and available in lesser amounts. We also expect detection resources to be more
abundant than interdiction and dual-purpose resources and we expect that dualpurpose resources are inherently more expensive than the other two resource types.
We thus generate uDd -, uIi -, and uBb -parameters as a function of the scenario parameters
using a uniform random variable. The lower bound on uDd is induced by an assumption
that at least one detection resource will be emplaced in each stage, and an upper
bound is induced by a combination of the policy that detection resources will not
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be co-located and the number of total detection resource locations. Equation (46)
illustrates for uDd , ∀ d ∈ D, the generation of a value from a uniform distribution and
the allocation allocation of an integer-valued proportion of that value by resource
type. Similarly, for interdiction and dual-purpose resource types, Equations (47) and
(48) illustrate the generation of a value from uniform distributions for uIi , ∀ i ∈ I,
and uBb , ∀ b ∈ B, respectively. The upper bound for the uniform distribution in
Equation (47) differs from that in Equation (46) because we expect the amount of
interdiction resources to be less than that of the detection resources. The upper
bound in Equation (48) is analogous to that in Equation (46) since the assumptions
for the placement of dual-purpose resources mirror that of detection resources in that
each resource improves detection within a stage.
!

&
(D + 1 − d) /

uDd =

X

'

d U (N , J ) , ∀ d ∈ D

(46)

d∈D

!

&
(I + 1 − i) /

uIi =

X

'

i U (N , 2N ) , ∀ i ∈ I

(47)

i∈I

!

&
uBb =

(B + 1 − b) /

X

'

b U (N , L) , ∀ b ∈ B

(48)

b∈B

Cost parameters also vary by resource type (i.e., d, i, and b, respectively), assuming that types with higher indices are the more capable and expensive resources.
Accordingly, the costs for each resource type are generated in a manner that assigns
higher costs to resource types with higher-valued indices. For detection assets, a cost
D
range of [cD
LB , cU B ] = [1, 10] is partitioned into D intervals having equal width, as-

signing the higher cost intervals to resource types with highest-valued indices, and
so forth. We slightly modify the intervals so they overlap by 10% of the interval
widths; the result is not a completely hierarchical partition. The costs of interdiction
62

resources by type are generated in an identical manner with identical lower and upper
bounds for cost, but the costs of dual-purpose resources by type are generated using
B
a cost range of [cB
LB , cU B ] = [5, 20]. The reason for the larger bounds of dual-purpose

costs is simply due to the dual-purpose nature of the resources. Equations (49)-(51)
illustrate the specific generation of the costs by resource type of detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resources, respectively, wherein ∆D =
and ∆B =

D
cD
U B −cLB
,
D

∆I =

cIU B −cILB
,
I

B
cB
U B −cLB
.
B


cDd = U cDLB + (d − 1) · ∆D , cDLB + d · ∆D , ∀ d ∈ D

(49)


cIi = U cILB + (i − 1) · ∆I , cILB + i · ∆I , ∀ i ∈ I

(50)


cBb = U cBLB + (b − 1) · ∆B , cBLB + b · ∆B , ∀ b ∈ B

(51)

Probability parameters vary by resource type and are calculated as a function
of distance. Specifically, the distance used to calculate probability of detection and
interdiction of an intruder is the shortest distance from the resource’s location to the
intruder path, henceforth referred to as distmin . For example, the minimum distance
from a detection location j to an intruder path ψ reads distDmin (j, ψ). The probability
of detection (which can be accomplished by a detection or dual-purpose resource)
from a resource location for a particular intruder is calculated using a logistic decay
function of distmin , as mentioned previously. The probability of interdiction (which
can be accomplished by an interdiction or a dual-purpose resource) from a resource
location for a particular intruder is calculated using an exponential decay function of
the aforementioned distmin . Equations (53)-(56) depict the probability functions used
to parameterize WIPC instances as functions of distmin with the appropriate indices,
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where pmax = 0.9 is the maximum probability of an emplaced resource successfully
detecting or interdicting the intruder, and dist0.5 indicates the distance at which a
resource’s probability of successfully detecting or interdicting an intruder is equal
to 0.5 and is a function of the resource type index. The dist0.5 calculations for
detection and interdiction resource types are such that the largest index (i.e., the
most effective) resource types have a 0.5 probability of success when the distance to
the intruder is 25% of the stage width, and this percentage is reduced for lower indices
as shown in Equation (52). This distance is adjusted to 15% of the stage width for
dual-purpose resource types, where we assume that dual-purpose resource types will
not accomplish the same level of effectiveness at the same distance as a dedicated
detection or interdiction resource type.

distD0.5 (d) =




pDdjψ distDmin (j, ψ) =

d
· 0.25 · stagewidth
D

pmax
1−pmax



n
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distBmin (l, ψ)
ln
distB0.5 (b)



0.5
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(56)

3.3.2

Validating the Model with an Illustrative Instance

Figure 4 depicts a small, illustrative instance used to validate WIPC and to illustrate how various objective function weighting combinations affect the optimal
solutions attained. The depicted instance consists of n = 3 stages with P = 3 possible intruder paths, each having an associated possible damage vp . For the defender,
there are J = 4 possible locations for detection assets, K = 4 possible locations for
interdiction assets, and L = 5 possible locations for dual-purpose assets. The defender also has two types of each type of asset from which to choose when deciding
which assets to use and where to emplace them.

Figure 4. Illustrative Instance of WIPC

As shown in Figure 4, the dual-purpose (and thus, more expensive) assets can only
be placed at locations in relatively close proximity to path p3 , which has the highest
value of vψ . That is, an intruder on path p3 can inflict the most damage, and it will
cost more money to properly defend that path. In contrast, the maximum amount
of damage an intruder traversing both paths p1 and p2 can inflict is lower, and those
paths collectively require less money to defend using a combination of detection and
interception assets.
Testing applied the Weighted Sum Method and invoked the commercial solver
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BARON to identify multiple Pareto Optimal (PO) solutions for this WIPC instance,
examining non-zero objective function weight combinations of (wc , we , wmax ) in increments of 0.1, such that wc + wmax + we = 1. Of note, the GAMS implementation of the WIPC formulation minimizes an intermediate decision variable defined as
z = wc fc + wmax fmax + we fe and additionally imposes the constraint z ≤ fc + fmax + fe
to bound further any solver-generated relaxations. For increasing values of wc , Figure
5 plots the optimal values of fe and fmax identified. For some weight combinations
(e.g., wc = 0.4), Figure 5 depicts only one point; this result indicates that all five of
the optimal solutions attained for the varying values of (we , wmax ) yielded the same
objective function values at optimality.

Figure 5. Optimal (fmax , fe )-values via the Weighted Sum Method to the Illustrative
WIPC Instance for Various wc -values

The results depicted in Figure 5 yield two important insights. First, a tradeoff
between system cost and effectiveness is evident for this illustrative instance. As wc
increases and the cost of the defense configuration becomes a higher relative priority,
the optimal values of both fe and fmax increase. Second, the optimal values of fe
and fmax are highly correlated (r = 0.995) over all combinations of objective function
weights examined; there exists redundancy in examining both of these objective functions in the WIPC formulation. Although there is not a guarantee that this result
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is generalizable to all instances of WIPC, we find its existence motivation to reduce
the number of objective functions considered in an effort to improve tractability. Beginning in Section 3.3.3, only one system effectiveness objective will be considered,
rendering WIPC as a bi-objective rather than a tri-objective formulation. Because fe
is a direct calculation via Constraint (29), whereas fmax is determined at optimality
relative to the lower bounding supports imposed via Constraint (39), fmax will be set
aside as an explicit objective function.
To further validate the formulation for this instance, we restrict our attention to
the optimal solutions for (wc , we , wmax ) ∈ {(0.1, 0.5, 0.4), (0.4, 0.3, 0.3), (0.7, 0.2, 0.1)},
respectively corresponding to low, medium, and high relative priorities on minimizing
defender costs with roughly similar priorities over the remaining objective functions
(at the 0.1 granularity of objective function weights). Table 16 presents the optimal
solutions for each combination of objective function weights. The second column reports the optimal objective function values, and the subsequent columns respectively
identify the combination of indices and asset type where detection, interdiction, and
dual-purpose assets are emplaced.
Table 16. Optimal solutions for three sample weight combinations
(wc , we , wmax )
(0.1, 0.5, 0.4)
(0.4, 0.3, 0.3)
(0.7, 0.2, 0.1)

∗
)
(fc∗ , fe∗ , fmax
(69.9, 3.0, 1.7)
(25.1, 16.5, 11.3)
(0, 65, 40)

(d, j)|x∗dj = 1
(1, 4), (2, 2), (2, 3)
(2, 2), (2, 3)
–

∗
(i, k)|yik
=1
(1, 3), (2, 2), (2, 4)
(1, 3), (2, 2)
–

∗
(b, l)|zbl
=1
(2, 4)
–
–

Within Table 16, as wc increases and the combined weights for effectiveness measures decrease, fewer dual-purpose resources are used and, eventually, no resources
are emplaced. These results are expected for this instance because the dual-purpose
resources are more expensive and their location sites are clustered around the path
capable of inflicting the most damage. Via the solutions to these different objective
function weights, the tradeoff between cost and effectiveness is further evident, both
between types of resources and whether to emplace resources at all.
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3.3.3

Identifying the Limitations of a Commercial Solver for Global
Optimization

It remains of interest to identify an appropriate solution methodology that efficiently finds high quality solutions. Given the WIPC is a non-convex, mixed-integer
nonlinear math programming (MINLP) formulation, we test a leading commercial
solver (i.e., BARON) designed for global optimization. We considered instances having combinations of sets of size P ∈ {20, 40, 60, 80} and, for the sake of simplicity,
common parametric values of J /K/L in the set {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}. BARON was invoked to solve 10 stochastically generated instances for each parametric combination,
each with alternative termination criteria of a 0% relative optimality gap and a time
limit of 2700 seconds of computational effort.
Table 17 reports the average relative optimality gap (%) attained for the 10 instances at each parametric combination, as well as the number of instances for which
a suboptimal solution was reported by BARON. Of note, the average relative optimality gap is strictly increasing for values of J /K/L for a given P-value, and the same
relationship holds for increasing values of P for a given J /K/L-parameter. These
general trends conform to intuition; solver performance degrades with an increasing
size of instances of WIPC. (Roughly similar trends exist for the number of suboptimal solutions reported by BARON.) More interesting is that the degradation of the
average relative optimality gap attained is greater with increases to the number of
locations available for defense asset emplacement than the number of intruder paths.
Table 18 reports the average computational effort (seconds) required by BARON
for the 10 instances at each parametric combination, as well as the number of instances for which BARON terminated due to the 2700 second limit on computational
effort. Although there did exist two instances (i.e., at (J /K/L, P) = (15, 20)) for
which BARON identified a global optimal solution upon termination at ∼2700 sec-
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Table 17. Average relative optimality gap (%) attained and number of instances (out
of 10) for which a suboptimal solution was identified using commercial solver BARON
for various instance sizes of WIPC
J /K/L
5
10
15
20
25

Number of Intruder Paths (P)
20
40
60
80
0.00 (0)
0.00 (0)
0.00 (0)
8.12 (1)
0.09 (1)
15.23 (3)
18.08 (3)
44.52 (7)
9.73 (2)
36.94 (5)
41.54 (5)
68.88 (8)
31.67 (4) 86.89 (10) 80.47 (9) 90.79 (10)
49.52 (6) 91.93 (10) 94.15 (10) 91.78 (10)

onds of computational effort, these results were anomalous; every suboptimal solution
reported in Table 17 resulted from a termination of BARON due to the limit on computational effort, as indicated in Table 18. Therefore, it may be possible to improve
the quality of solutions identified by BARON in Table 17, but doing so would be
relatively inefficient.
Table 18. Average computational effort (seconds) required and the number of instances
(out of 10) for which the commercial solver BARON terminated due to a 2700 second
time limitation, for various instance sizes of WIPC
J /K/L
5
10
15
20
25

Number of Intruder Paths (P)
20
40
60
80
1.9 (0)
8.0 (0)
47.9 (0)
389.1 (1)
108.7 (1)
1207.9 (3)
1391.3 (3)
2113.2 (7)
1099.0 (4) 2115.0 (5)
2066.3 (5)
2409.9 (8)
1378.6 (4) 2702.0 (10) 2484.4 (9) 2700.4 (10)
2116.0 (7) 2705.6 (10) 2702.2 (10) 2701.7 (10)

Considering the collective testing results, a commercial solver designed for global
optimization remains capable of identifying high quality solutions when considering
a greater number of intruder paths, but its use to consider instances having a larger
number of options for locating defensive assets is limited when the efficiency of a
solution method is important. Moreover, the general trends observed portend yet
greater challenges to solver efficiency with increased instance size(s). Such a limitation is challenging to accept for practical applications of the WIPC, motivating the
exploration of a metaheuristic capable of efficiently addressing larger instances of the
problem.
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3.3.4

Metaheuristics as an Alternative to a Commercial Solver for
Global Optimization

In this section, we show that GAs are a viable substitute for a commercial global
solver for solving instances of WIPC. As discussed in Section 1.2, we use NSGA-II and
RWGA as GAs for MOO, and BARON as the commercial solver used to solve the same
randomly generated instance with 5-, 20-, and 45-minute run-time limits. For both
GAs, the common parameters are population size (n = 100) and mutation probability
during crossover (p = 0.3). RWGA has a specific parameter called Nelite , which is the
number of previously discovered PO solutions that are reintroduced to the current
population during each iteration. After completing pre-testing tuning, Nelite = 5 was
chosen for this instance. All testing was completed on a 2.5 GHz with 16 GB of RAM
and an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6500U processor. GAMS modeling language (Version
30.1.0) was used to invoke the commercial solver BARON (Version 19.12.7). To solve
subproblems, BARON invoked IBM ILOG CPLEX (Version 12.10.0) and/or MINOS
(Version 5.5), as appropriate. RWGA and NSGA-II were coded in RStudio (Version
3.3.2). BARON testing was completed by solving the randomly generated WIPC
instance for nine weight combinations where wc ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9} and we = 1 − wc ,
as an attempt to explore a wider range of solutions on the Pareto front. For each
of the weight combinations, BARON was allowed the same run-time provided to
RWGA and NSGA-II, wherein they could complete as many iterations as possible.
That is, BARON solved each of the nine weight combinations with a 5-minute limit
whereas NSGA-II and RWGA compiled and returned entire Pareto fronts within a
single 5-minute limit on computational effort. This time-based termination criterion
was imposed to ensure a more fair comparison for BARON, since it could be used to
simultaneously solve multiple instances via parallel processing.
Figure 6 presents the PO solutions obtained by the three solution methods within
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Figure 6. Pareto fronts generated by BARON, NSGA-II, and RWGA with a 5-minute
run-time limit

Table 19. Comparison of Commercial Solver (BARON), NSGA-II, and RWGA regarding the solutions returned after 5 minutes of run-time

Solution Method
BARON
NSGA-II
RWGA

No. of Solutions
Reported
9
100
27

No. of PO Solutions
Reported
6
26
27
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No. of PO Solutions
Reported Relative to all
Reported Solutions
6
9
21

the 5-minute run-time limit. Readily observable is that each of the three solution
methods produce some non-dominated solutions (with respect to all solutions reported) at various regions along the front. For smaller values of fe , NSGA-II produces
PO solutions. For larger values of fe , BARON produces PO solutions and, for values
of fe between 10 and 20, RWGA produces PO solutions. Table 19 reports the number
of PO solutions identified by each method, both within each method’s final set of solutions and with respect to the collective set of solutions identified by all three methods.
The first column of Table 19 indicates the number of total solutions returned by each
method. Note that NSGA-II returns the entire population upon termination, and
only afterwards are the PO solutions identified; in contrast, RWGA reports the external population where only PO solutions are stored, which explains the differences
(or lack thereof) between reported values in the first and second columns. The third
column of Table 19 identifies the number of solutions identified by a given method
that are non-dominated when compared to the collective set of solutions reported by
all three methods. Clearly, RWGA reports more PO solutions relative to the other
methods when the computational effort was limited to 5 minutes.

Figure 7. Pareto fronts generated by BARON, NSGA-II, and RWGA with a 20-minute
run-time limit

Figure 7 displays the Pareto fronts generated by all three solution methods when
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Table 20. Comparison of Commercial Solver (BARON), NSGA-II, and RWGA regarding the solutions returned after 20 minutes of run-time

Solution Method
BARON
NSGA-II
RWGA

No. of Solutions
Reported
9
100
29

No. of PO Solutions
Reported
6
38
29

No. of PO Solutions
Reported Relative to all
Reported Solutions
4
22
11

they are limited to a 20-minute run-time. The Pareto front generated by NSGA-II
almost completely dominates the fronts generated by RWGA and BARON. Notably,
the solutions reported by BARON are the exact same as those reported after 5 minutes, indicating that BARON’s reported solutions did not improve with time, and
they are on an extreme with respect to weights for fe and fc (i.e., the objective functions are not well scaled for the use of the Weighted Sum Method). Table 20 updates
the results from Table 19 for the 20-minute time limit. Relative to the 5-minute
results, NSGA-II improves the most, as evidenced by the number of PO solutions
reported relative to the collective set of solutions identified by all three methods. Of
the 38 solutions that NSGA-II reported after 20 minutes, 22 (57%) of them were still
PO when compared to the solutions reported by RWGA and BARON.

Figure 8. Pareto fronts generated by BARON, NSGA-II, and RWGA with a 45-minute
run-time limit

Figure 8 displays the Pareto fronts generated by all three solutions methods when
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Table 21. Comparison of Commercial Solver (BARON), NSGA-II, and RWGA regarding the solutions returned after 45 minutes of run-time

Solution Method
BARON
NSGA-II
RWGA

No. of Solutions
Reported
9
100
41

No. of PO Solutions
Reported
6
78
41

No. of PO Solutions
Reported Relative to all
Reported Solutions
4
70
4

using a 45-minute time limit. Similar to the results after 20 minutes, NSGA-II exhibits
a strong Pareto front that dominates most of the solutions returned by RWGA as
well as some solutions produced by BARON, but it does not dominate the BARON
solutions produced for high values of we . Table 21 further demonstrates NSGA-II’s
dominance; 70 out of 78 solutions (i.e., 90%) produced by NSGA-II are still PO
when compared to all solutions identified by the other two methods. Again, BARON
produced the exact same nine solutions, of which only six were PO; as before, the
solutions are not improving when allowing more time for solver convergence. Over
all three time limits allowed, RWGA and NSGA-II returned a higher number and
quality of solutions, but NSGA-II solutions dominated more RWGA solutions as the
run-time limit increased.
Table 22.
RWGA

Comparison of convergence over time between BARON, NSGA-II, and

Method
BARON
NSGA-II
RWGA

No. of PO
Solutions
Reported After
5 min.
6
26
27

No. of PO Solutions
Reported at 5 min.
that are still present
at 20 min.
6
0
4

No. of PO Solutions
Reported at 20 min. that
are still present at 45
min.
6
0
8

Table 22 compares the convergence of BARON, NSGA-II, and RWGA by examining the number of PO solutions that are returned with smaller run-time limits and the
degree to which they “survive” to the next largest run-time limit. BARON did not
evolve with time at all, as evidenced by the fact that the six PO solutions it returned
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are identical after 5, 20, and 45 minutes of run-time. NSGA-II on the other hand,
reported 26 PO solutions after 5 minutes of run-time, of which 0 were returned again
after 20 minutes of run-time, indicating improvement in the set of solutions identified
with greater computational effort. Likewise, none of the solutions NSGA-II reported
after 45 minutes of run-time had been identified after 20 minutes. RWGA reported
a similar number of solutions after 5 minutes and, while only four of them were still
present at the 20-minute mark, eight of the solutions reported at 20 minutes were still
present after 45 minutes had passed. This result indicates that NSGA-II exhibited
the superlative convergence of solutions between the 20- and 45-minute time limits.

Figure 9. Pareto fronts generated by NSGA-II with 5-, 20-, and 45-minute run-time
limits

Figure 10. Pareto fronts generated by RWGA with 5-, 20-, and 45-minute run-time
limits

Figures 9 and 10 display the Pareto fronts generated after 5, 20, and 45 minutes
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by NSGA-II and RWGA, respectively. NSGA-II clearly improves with time and,
combined with the results shown in Table 22, NSGA-II produced better Pareto fronts
that dominated previously identified fronts. RWGA also returns better Pareto fronts
as the run-time limit increases, but RWGA’s improvement is not as stark as the
improvement shown by NSGA-II. These results, combined with the data in Table
22, indicate that NSGA-II and RWGA both outperform BARON when solving this
WIPC instance, with NSGA-II exhibiting a better performance than RWGA.
3.3.5

RWGA vs. NSGA-II as a Solution Method for Larger WIPC
Instances

This section compares RWGA and NSGA-II as an extension of the testing reported
in Table 17. Allowing the number of intruder paths to equal 25, 30, and 35, while also
increasing the number of locations for each type of resource to 80, 100, and 120 allows
for an examination of RWGA and NSGA-II for larger, more challenging instances of
WIPC.
Table 23. Mean and Standard Deviation of PO solutions reported relative to all reported solutions for 10 instances of WIPC solved using RWGA and NSGA-II (2700second time limitation)
J /K/L
25
30
35

GA
RWGA
NSGA-II
RWGA
NSGA-II
RWGA
NSGA-II

Number of Intruder Paths (P)
80
100
120
9.8 ± 5.7
11.2 ± 7.7 11.4 ± 7.8
74.7 ± 9.3 66.1 ± 13.3 64.6 ± 9.6
7.1 ± 3.8
8.3 ± 4.1
7.8 ± 2.5
69.7 ± 8.7 63.4 ± 11.1 49.5 ± 8.4
11.9 ± 7.7 10.1 ± 6.0 10.4 ± 3.8
58 ± 13.1
46.3 ± 9.6 38.8 ± 6.7

Table 23 details the results of the direct comparison between RWGA and NSGAII on nine different problem sizes. In each problem size, 10 random instances were
randomly generated and solved by both RWGA and NSGA-II with a 2700-second runtime limit. Once the PO solutions for each metaheuristic were returned, the solutions
were examined in aggregate for a given instance, and the number of solutions that
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were still PO for each metaheuristic were recorded. The data in each cell is the
mean ± s.d. of the number of solutions reported that are PO relative to all reported
solutions across the 10 random instances. NSGA-II outperforms RWGA at every
instance size. Via paired t-tests with α = 0.01, NSGA-II reported a significantly
larger number of PO solutions than RWGA, leading us to recommend it as a method
for solving instances of the WIPC.

3.4

Conclusions
Given an intruder attempting to traverse a spatially-decomposed region via mul-

tiple possible paths, this research aims to effectively and cost-efficiently identify a
defensive strategy that locates sets of detection resources and interdiction resources,
each of which has different types of resources that vary by cost and capability. This
research formulated and validated a mixed-integer nonlinear programming model formulation to solve the underlying problem using a leading commercial solver and two
different metaheuristics as solution methods.
In comparing the solution methodologies, limitations for identifying a global optimal solution via a leading commercial solver (BARON) were identified during computational testing. Given a 2700-second limit for run-time, BARON was able to
identify a feasible solution quickly but failed to identify an optimal solution for most
test instances, especially as scenario parameters increased in size. The relative optimality gap achieved by BARON in these test instances was 91% in the largest-sized
instance tested, which was not a particularly large instance. This result motivated
the consideration of metaheuristics as an alternative solution method.
For the two multi-objective GAs, RWGA and NSGA-II, each of which was selected
based on different conceptual performance characteristics, empirical testing demonstrated their superior performance in comparison with BARON, with respect to the
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both the quantity of non-dominated solutions identified (individually or relative to all
methods tested) and the required computational effort to do so. Subsequent testing
of the two GAs over a designed set of test instances identified NSGA-II as the recommended technique to solve larger-sized instances of the underlying problem. Even as
instance sizes increased, NSGA-II produced more non-dominated solutions relative
to the solutions returned by RWGA at a statistically significant level.
A sequel to this research will examine this problem within a game theoretic context, wherein a rational intruder can observe the defender’s asset location decisions
prior to commencing an intrusion. The resulting extensive form game motivates the
exploration of a bilevel programming model framework and a corresponding examination of solution methodologies to not only identify the intruder’s optimal second-stage
response(s) to a defender’s asset location decisions, but to also identify the optimal
first-stage decisions by the defender.
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IV. Intruder Detection and Interdiction Modeling: A
Bilevel Programming Approach for Ballistic Missile Defense
Asset Location
4.1

Introduction
The rapid and recent proliferation of adversary missile threats induces a need for

a similar evolution in missile defense of the United States (US) and it’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner, Canada. Potential threats arise from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran, two nation-states developing and expanding their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology (United
States Department of Defense, 2019). The developing capabilities augmented with
the repeated threats to use them against the US (Heinrichs, 2020; Martin, 2021)
has compelled the US to prioritize the development, procurement, and fielding of an
every-increasingly complex missile defense enterprise (United States Department of
Defense, 2019).
In 1944 during World War II (WWII), Germany fired the first long-range, guided
ballistic missile, the V-2 rocket (Missile Defense Agency, 2013). The V-2 had a
range of only 200 miles and was quite inaccurate compared to contemporary missile
technology but, due to the lack of a defense in place for such a threat outside of
bombing the launch sites, it still managed to significantly damage sites in Great
Britain (Missile Defense Agency, 2013). After WWII, the US and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) engaged in the Cold War, during which the US
and USSR simultaneously expanded their ballistic missile and ballistic missile defense
(BMD) technology over the course of approximately 45 years. Presently, there are at
least eight countries capable of launching ICBMs and are considered adversaries or
potential adversaries of the US (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Among
these countries, and particularly aggressive with missile development and threats to
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use them, the DPRK has successfully tested its ICBM, the Hwasong-15, as recently
as 2017, and it is thought to have the potential to reach the entire US (United States
Department of Defense, 2019).
A ballistic missile’s flight is decomposed into three phases of flight: boost, midcourse, and terminal. In the boost phase, the missile is being propelled into Earth’s
upper atmosphere by a rocket (National Research Council, 2008). Once there, the
missile is in the midcourse phase and being powered by only gravity as it falls toward
its target on Earth’s surface and re-enters the atmosphere. The missile enters the
terminal phase once it is back in Earth’s atmosphere and makes its final approach to
the target.
The current US BMD enterprise is comprised of detection and interdiction assets
for stopping adversary missiles from reaching the US, and these existing assets are generally developed to address detection or interdiction of missiles in a particular phase
of flight. Since the advent of radar in WWII, the US has developed radar technology
such as the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX), an ocean-going semi-submersible platform equipped with an X-Band radar that can be positioned as needed in the ocean
(Missile Defense Agency, 2018a). Modern missile defense leverages surface-based missiles in order to interdict BMs in flight. Examples of this include the Patriot missile
defense system used in Operation Desert Storm, Iron Dome developed by Israel and
used in the Gaza-Israel Conflict, and Ground-Based Interceptors currently in use by
the US.
The proliferation of adversary missile technology has given rise to the development
of new missile defense assets over time. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) requested
$9.1 billion for Fiscal Year 2021 to continue the development of new technology to aid
in this defense (Missile Defense Agency, 2020). This budget marks an increase from
$7.6 billion just five years ago (Missile Defense Agency, 2017a). Many assets have yet

80

to be fully developed and fielded, but research remains very active. For example, the
Department of Defense has stated that the F-35 is slated to be equipped with technology that will aid in the attempt to intercept ballistic missiles in the boost phase,
which is currently identified as a very difficult and expensive task (United States Department of Defense, 2019). Moreover, the MDA has allocated approximately $250
million to space-based sensors that will aid in the tracking of ballistic missiles in flight
(Missile Defense Agency, 2019).
With both the current and evolving threats fielded by adversaries, the US BMD
enterprise faces the daunting task of developing and integrating new detection and interdiction resources effectively. With the use of existing resources and the anticipation
of new resources in coming years, an enterprise approach to the BMD problem is necessary and appropriate to ensure a cohesive response to adversary threats. Given this
motivating problem, this research seeks to address the following problem statement:
Effectively defend a set of population centers against attack by a limited number
of ICBMs by locating sets of BMD resources to detect and interdict ICBMs over
a range of launch-to-target missile paths and their respective, spatio-temporally
defined flight stages, assuming an adversary will observe the defensive asset
location decisions and respond with an ICBM targeting strategy that maximizes
the expected damage of an attack.

4.1.1

Literature Review

This research is informed by four threads of research within the literature. The
modeling herein leverages concepts and approaches from general missile defense studies, intruder detection and interdiction models, game-theoretic frameworks for defense
problems, and defender-attacker models for missile defense from both the defender
and intruder point of view. With respect to its solution methodologies, this research
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applies bilevel program modeling techniques techniques as well as a metaheuristic
approach to explore the solution space.
Given this work seeks to examine a ballistic missile defense problem, a brief examination of historical missile defense studies is warranted. Garwin and Bethe (1968)
studied the “light” anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system that Defense Secretary
McNamara authorized, arguing that it would prove ineffective against the current adversary missile technology. Johnson (1970) subsequently studied the current state of
US radar technology and provided a detailed explanation of how US radar is used in
the larger US BMD system. Following President Reagan’s declaration that a spacebased ballistic missile defense system would be a useful asset, Bethe et al. (1984)
published work suggesting that such a system would prove ineffective and unlikely
to protect the US from an adversarial nuclear attack. This early perspective on
space-based interception of ballistic missiles differs greatly from current studies and
opinions on space-based BMD, such as the most recent Missile Defense Review, which
states that space-based BMD will be a necessary component of the future architecture providing boost-phase defense (United States Department of Defense, 2019). In
a somewhat recent study, Wilkening (2000) provided a more concrete approach to
examining probabilistic models, employing various adversary shooting philosophies
and providing optimal interceptor allocations for each.
The second major thread of research that informs this work is intruder detection
and interdiction. Lessin et al. (2018) developed a bilevel programming model to
optimally allocate sensors to aid in the detection of an intruder. Similarly, Eliş et al.
(2021) modeled the defense of a region of terrain using guards deployed such that each
piece of the terrain is observed by at least one guard. Scheiper et al. (2019) solved an
electric network design problem to support demand by electric vehicles. Although not
an intruder detection and interdiction problem, the authors’ work was its conceptual
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dual; their research seeks to enable travel on a network rather than interdict it.
Haywood et al. (2020) created a model that, once solved with a global solver, provides
the defender with optimal location decisions for detection and interdiction resources in
order to maximize the success of interdicting an intruder on a known path of intrusion.
In an extension of this work, Haywood et al. (2021) solved a similar problem with
multiple intruders on a set of paths with a known probability of use, employing a
genetic algorithm to solve a more complex model. Components of these models are
incorporated within the bilevel programming architecture of the current work.
The third thread of literature that lends insight to this work is game theory, specifically Stackelberg games. This is a game in which the amount won by one player is
exactly equal to the amount lost of the other player (i.e., “zero-sum”), and players
take turns making their moves (i.e., “extensive-form”) (Shoham and Leyton-Brown,
2008). At each turn, a player is aware of what action other players took on the previous turn as well as the value of their current move in terms of how it affects both
themselves and their opponent (i.e., “complete and perfect information”) (Shoham
and Leyton-Brown, 2008). This type of game-theoretic framework is especially applicable to BMD scenarios because the adversaries in the scenario are making location or
launch decisions in turn, informed by observed adversary decisions. Additionally, the
BMD scenario can be modeled appropriately as a zero-sum game with the assumption that the intruder and defender are maximizing and minimizing, respectively, the
damage inflicted by intruder missiles.
The fourth thread of literature that is relevant to this research includes missile
defense studies that employ a defender-attacker model. These types of studies utilize
a framework in which a defender makes the first decision, usually allocating their
resources in anticipation of an attack, and subsequently an intruder observes this decision and reacts accordingly when deciding their best course of action. An example of
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this can be seen in work by Brown et al. (2006), wherein the authors applied defenderattacker and defender-attacker-defender modeling techniques to problems related to
terrorists attempting to attack critical infrastructure. Brown et al. (2005) applied
this modeling technique specifically to theater ballistic missile defense, and develop a
decision-support tool for decision-makers to aid with the positioning of defense assets
to prepare for missile attacks. The research presented herein differs from the work
by Brown et al. (2005) in that an enterprise view is adopted; both detection and
interdiction resources hosted on various platforms are considered. Boardman et al.
(2017) present a defender-attacker-defender model for the location of surface-to-air
missile batteries, wherein a defender first locates their batteries and an intruder observes these decisions and launches their missile attack. The defender then observes
this attack and makes decisions regarding the assignment of interceptor missiles in
batteries to incoming attacker missiles. Han et al. (2016) preceded Boardman et al.
(2017) and studied the problem with homogeneous interceptor missiles. This research
will not explicitly model the latter part of this problem, instead focusing on the initial defender decision of locating assets to minimize damage done by intruder missile
attacks, assuming the capacity of an interdiction resource is not overwhelmed by the
number of ballistic missiles encountered.
Within the context of the related literature, this research makes three contributions. First, this research sets forth a game theoretic, bilevel program modeling
framework for the problem of allocating missile defense resources to detect and interdict intruder ballistic missiles attempting to destroy valuable targets. Second, it
applies a series of transformations that reformulate the model as a single-level mathematical program that is shown to be convex and, hence, readily solvable to optimality
by any of a number of commercial optimization solvers. Third, the research conducts
testing to both illustrate its efficacy and empirically examine its practical tractabil-
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ity, both of which are sound for application on large-scale instances of the underlying
problem.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the mathematical programming formulation and solution methodology; Section 3 validates the
model for an illustrative instance and conducts the aforementioned empirical testing;
and Section 4 summarizes the resulting insights and identifies logical extensions to
this research.

4.2

Models and Solution Methodology
First, we develop a bilevel programming model of the problem in which a single

defender locates resources, after which an attacker observes the defender’s actions and
routes its missiles accordingly to inflict the most damage. That is, the defender aims
to minimize the maximum amount of expected damage inflicted by attacker missiles.
We assume the attacker and defender have good intelligence on each others’ capabilities (i.e., complete information), and the attacker can observe defender locations and
reasonably infer their allocation of resources (i.e., perfect information).

4.2.1

Bilevel Mathematical Programming Model

To formulate the mathematical program to address the underlying problem, it is
necessary to define the following sets, parameters, and decision variables.
Sets
• U = {1, 2, ..., U} is the set of launch sites from which the attacker may launch
missiles, indexed by u.
• V = {1, 2, ..., V} is the set of target sites to which the attacker may aim missiles,
indexed by v.
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• P = {(1, 1), (1, 2), . . . , (U, V)} is the set of paths over which the attacker may
traverse through the defender’s territory, indexed by ψ. The size of this set is
denoted U · V = P.
• S = {1, 2, ..., S} is the set of distinguishable stages over which the attacker
may be detected and interdicted by the defender’s enterprise of sensors and
interdictors, indexed by s. Relative to the set of stages, two assumptions are
made regarding the attacker’s path. First, we assume that each path transits
every stage. Second, the stages are numbered in ascending order, as an attacker
would encounter them when traversing any path. For the research application
herein, S = 3 to represent the boost, midcourse, and terminal stages of adversary missile flight, but we retain the parameter-based representation within the
formulation to support its generalizability for other, related problems pertaining
to attacker detection and interception.
• D = {1, 2, ..., D} is the set of different detection resource types, indexed by d,
each of which pertains to different capabilities (e.g., range, effectiveness).
• J = {1, 2, ..., J } is the set of possible locations at which detection resources can
[
Js = J.
be located, indexed by j. J is partitioned by stage, where
s∈S

• I = {1, 2, ..., I} is the set of different interdiction resource types, indexed by
i, each of which has different capabilities (e.g., speed, range, probability of
success).
• K = {1, 2, ..., K} is the set of possible locations at which interdiction resources
can be located, indexed by k. Similar to set J, the set K is likewise partitioned
over S.
• B = {1, 2, ..., B} is the set of dual-purpose resource types (i.e., resources that
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can both detect and interdict an attacker), indexed by b (or b0 ), each of which
pertains to different capabilities (e.g., speed, range, probability of interdiction,
probability of detection).
• L = {1, 2, ..., L} is the set of possible locations at which dual-purpose resources
can be located, indexed by l (or l0 ). Similar to sets J and K, the set L is likewise
partitioned over S.
Parameters
• rψ > 0: the expected damage that a missile on path ψ would inflict if not
interdicted.
• uDd , uIi , uBb : the maximum number of detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose
resources that can be emplaced, respectively of types d, i, and b.
• ms : the maximum number of interception engagements that can be attempted
within each stage s.
• mψ : the maximum number of engagements of an intruder path ψ by a given
interceptor.
• λ: an integer value equal to the maximum number of missiles launched by the
attacker.
I
BI
• rangeDd , rangeBD
b , rangei , rangeb : the detection ranges for detection resources

of type d and dual-purpose resources of type b, and interdiction ranges for interdiction resources of type i, and dual-purpose resources of type b, respectively.
• aDdjψs : a binary parameter equal to 1 if the closest point in stage s on path ψ
to location j is less than or equal to rangeDd .
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• aBD
blψs : a binary parameter equal to 1 if the closest point in stage s on path ψ to
location l is less than or equal to rangeBD
b .
• pIikψs : the probability that an attacker on path ψ is interdicted by an interdiction
resource of type i emplaced at location k during flight stage s.
• pBI
blψs : the probability that an attacker on path ψ is interdicted by a dual-purpose
resource of type b emplaced at location l during flight stage s.
I
• γikψs
: a binary parameter equal to 1 if the closest point in stage s on path ψ

to location k is less than or equal to rangeIi .
BI
• γblψs
: a binary parameter equal to 1 if the closest point in stage s on path ψ to

location l is less than or equal to rangeBI
b .
Decision Variables

• xdj : a binary variable equal to 1 if a detection resource of type d is emplaced
at location j, and 0 otherwise.
• yik : a binary variable equal to 1 if an interdiction resource of type i is emplaced
at location k, and 0 otherwise.
• zbl : a binary variable equal to 1 if a dual-purpose resource of type b is emplaced
at location l, and 0 otherwise.
• δψ : a binary variable equal to 1 if path ψ is used by the attacker and 0 otherwise.
I
• θikψs
: a non-negative integer variable equal to 1 if an interdiction resource of

type i emplaced at location k is employed to engage an attacker on path ψ
during stage s.
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BI
• θblψs
: a non-negative integer variable equal to 1 if a dual-purpose resource of

type b emplaced at location l is employed to engage an attacker on path ψ
during stage s.
• πψI : the probability of an attacker on path ψ being detected and subsequently
interdicted.
Leveraging the aforementioned notation, we formulate the model P1 as follows.

min max
x,y,z,
δ

θI ,θBI ,π I

X

δψ rψ (1 − πψI )

(57)

ψ∈P

!
s.t. (1 − πψI ) =

Y YY
s∈S

1 − pIikψs

YY
I
θikψs

i∈I k∈K

1 − pBI
blψs

BI
θblψs

, ∀ψ∈P

b∈B l∈L

(58)
!
I
θikψs
≤ mψ γikψs

XX

aDdjψs xdj +

d∈D j∈J

XX

aBD
blψs zbl

, ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K, ψ ∈ P, s ∈ S,

b∈B l∈L

(59)
!
BI
θblψs
≤ mψ γblψs

XX

aDdjψs xdj +

XX

aBD
b0 l0 ψs zb0 l0

, ∀ b ∈ B, l ∈ L, ψ ∈ P, s ∈ S,

b0 ∈B l0 ∈L

d∈D j∈J

(60)
I
θikψs
≤ mψ yik , ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K, ψ ∈ P, s ∈ S,

(61)

BI
θblψs
≤ mψ zbl , ∀ b ∈ B, l ∈ L, ψ ∈ P, s ∈ S,
XX
XX
I
BI
≤ ms , ∀ ψ ∈ P, ∀ s ∈ S,
θikψs
+
θblψs

(62)

i∈I k∈K

X

(63)

b∈B l∈L

I
θikψs
≤ mψ , ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K, ψ ∈ P,

(64)

BI
θblψs
≤ mψ , ∀ b ∈ B, l ∈ L, ψ ∈ P,

(65)

xdj ≤ uDd , ∀ d ∈ D,

(66)

s∈S

X
s∈S

X
j∈J
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X

yik ≤ uIi , ∀ i ∈ I,

(67)

zbl ≤ uBb , ∀ b ∈ B,

(68)

δψ ≤ λ,

(69)

k∈K

X
l∈L

X
ψ∈P

0 ≤ πψI ≤ 1, ∀ ψ ∈ P,

(70)

xdj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ d ∈ D, j ∈ J

(71)

yik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K

(72)

zbl ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ b ∈ B, l ∈ L

(73)

δψ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ ψ ∈ P,

(74)

I
θikψs
∈ Z+ , ∀ i ∈ I, k ∈ K, ψ ∈ P, s ∈ S,

(75)

BI
θblψs
∈ Z+ , ∀ b ∈ B, l ∈ L, ψ ∈ P, s ∈ S,

(76)

The objective (57) of this formulation reflects the zero-sum nature of the game
being played between attacker and defender. The attacker’s objective is to maximize
the expected damage done by their missiles and the defender’s objective is to minimize
the same expression. The order of operators in Equation (57) indicates the defender
first making the decisions to locate detection and interdiction resources, assigning
them to identified, potential missile paths (i.e., inferred from known missile launch
sites and possible missile targets), after which the attacker observes the defender’s actions and selects targets to inflict maximal cumulative expected damage. Constraint
(58) calculates the probability an attacker missile is detected and subsequently interdicted by defender assets, with an underlying assumption that the probability of
detection and subsequent interdiction between stages is independent. Additionally,
we assume that, if a detection asset is within range of an attacker missile during a
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given stage, then it is detected with certainty. Constraint (59) ensures interdiction
resources can only be deployed by the defender if the attacker missile can be detected
by an emplaced asset. Similarly, Constraint (60) ensures that dual-purpose interdiction resources can be deployed to intercept an attacker missile only if the attacker
missile is being detected by defender resources. Constraints (61)-(62) are assignment
constraints in which interdiction and dual-purpose assets are only assigned to be
launched from a location if they have been placed at that location by the defender.
That is, the defender may not employ interdiction resources from locations that they
have not been placed. Constraint (63) places an upper bound on the engagements
that can be made against each attacker per stage in intruder paths. For example,
the defender may choose to limit the number of engagements in the ballistic stage of
each attacker path to two. Constraints (64)-(65) place an upper bound on the number of engagements from each interdiction location to each path utilizing interdiction
and dual-purpose resources, respectively. Constraints (66)-(68) limit the number of
detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resources that can be emplaced by type, respectively, and Constraint (69) limits the number of missiles that can be launched by
the attacker. Finally, Constraint (70) places 0-1 bounds on the probability of detection and subsequent interdiction on each path by the defender, Constraints (71)-(74)
detail the binary nature of defender location and attacker path decision variables, and
Constraints (75)-(76) ensure the assignment variables for engagements are positive
integers.
Noting the nonlinearity observed in Constraint (58), a logarithmic transformation

is performed by introducing a new variable φIψ = ln 1 − πψI . Constraint (78) will
replace Constraint (58), and the transformed objective function is represented in
Equation (77).
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min max
x,y,z,
δ

X

I

δψ rψ eφψ

(77)

ψ∈P

θI ,θBI ,φIψ


φIψ =

X

X

X


s∈S



I
θikψs
ln 1 − pIikψs +

i∈I k∈K(i,ψ,s)

X

X



BI
 , ∀ ψ ∈ P.
θblψs
ln 1 − pBI
blψs

b∈B l∈L(b,ψ,s)

(78)
We denote the reformulated model as P2 with the objective function as depicted
in Equation (77), bounded by Constraints (59)-(76) and (78). The main advantage of
P2 over P1 is the reformulated constraints are linear, yielding a polytope as its feasible
region. We observe that P1 consists of bilinear terms (i.e., products of the attacker
and defender decision variables), whereas P2 has defender variables in exponentiation.
Section 4.2.2 further examines P2 and presents a solution method that allows the use
of a commercial solver.

4.2.2

Solution Methodology

The special structure of the lower-level attacker problem can be exploited in a
manner that allows for a reformulation of P2 into a single-level minimization problem.
Within the bilevel structure of Problem P2, note that, for a fixed defender solution,
the attacker is solving a knapsack problem with items having a value of rψ eφψ and
equal costs. Thus, the binary restriction on the δψ -variables may be relaxed and, for
λ ∈ Z+ , a binary-valued solution to the relaxed lower-level problem will yield the
optimal objective function value. We denote P3 as the model obtained by relaxing
the binary constraints on δψ (i.e., replacing Constraint (74) in P2 with Constraints
(79) and (80)).
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δψ ≤ 1,

∀ψ∈P

(79)

δψ ≥ 0,

∀ψ∈P

(80)

Proposition 1. For a fixed upper-level (i.e., defender) solution to P3, a binary-valued
optimal solution to the lower-level (i.e., attacker) problem exists.
Proof. As seen in the objective (77) and Constraints (69), (79) and (80), the lowerlevel problem of P3 is a relaxation of a simple knapsack problem in which the value
of each “knapsack” item (i.e., expected damage inflicted by each attacker missile) is
I

rψ eφψ , and only λ items can be placed in the knapsack (i.e., fired at target sites).
Therefore, for a cardinality weighted knapsack problem, an optimal solution uses a
strict prioritization of the items based on their value, subject to total capacity.
The optimal solution to P3, (zP∗ 3 ), which exists by Proposition 1, is clearly an
upper bound to the P2 solution (zP∗ 2 ) since P3 is employing a relaxation on δψ in the
attacker problem. Due to the lower-level attacker problem consisting of a relaxation
to a knapsack problem, the solution to P3 portends a solution to P2 in terms of
δψ consisting of a binary 0-1 vector. By the properties of a knapsack problem with
cardinality weights on items, this binary valued solution is the attacker’s best response
to the defender’s component of the optimal solution to P3.
The bilevel structure of P3 contains the relaxation of the attacker problem, which
is simply a (integer-relaxed) knapsack problem for which the dual is quite useful.
Adopting a technique employed by Wood (1993) for a bilevel program having the
same objective function for both decision-makers (i.e., a zero-sum, extensive form
game with perfect and complete information, in the game theoretic context), we can
take the dual of the lower-level (i.e., inner) problem to yield a single-level optimization
93

problem. Noting the linear form of the inner problem in P3, we assign dual variables
α and βψ to Constraints (69) and (79), respectively. For the zero-sum Stackelberg
game represented in P3, we can take the dual of the inner problem (e.g., see Wood
(1993); Lunday et al. (2010); González-Dı́az et al. (2021)) and solve the resulting
single-level optimization problem using a commercial solver.
The resulting formulation, denoted Problem P4, is represented in (81)–(85) and
obtained by replacing the lower-level (attacker) problem in P3 with its dual.

min
x,y,z,θI
θBI ,φIψ ,α,βψ

αλ +

X

βψ

(81)

ψ∈P
I

s.t. α + βψ ≥ rψ eφψ , ∀ ψ ∈ P,

(82)

α ≥ 0,

(83)

βψ ≥ 0, ∀ ψ ∈ P,

(84)

Constraints (59)-(68), (70)-(76), and (78).

(85)

The only nonlinear constraint in P4 is Constraint (82). We propose that Constraint
(82) is, in fact, convex, and therefore P4 is a convex program (i.e., it has a linear
(convex) objective function with a convex feasible region). To recall, Bazaraa et al.
(2013) define a convex program as one in which the goal is to minimize a function g(x)
such that x ∈ S, where g is a convex function and S is a convex set. The structure of
convex programs is enticing because a local minimum of the program is also a global
minimum, so an interior point algorithm will converge to a global optimal solution.
Proposition 2. P4 is a convex program.
Proof. Clearly, the linear objective (81) is a convex function. Constraints (82)-(85)
induce the feasible region of P4, and all but Constraint (82) are linear and, hence,
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convex. A brief analysis identifies that Constraint (82) is also convex.
Considering Constraint (82) in canonical form (e.g., see Bazaraa et al. (2013)),


I
where g(x) = rψ eφψ − α − βψ ≤ 0 and x = φIψ , α, βψ , it has a Hessian of the form


φIψ

rψ e

H(x) = 
 0

0


0 0

0 0
.

0 0
I

The only non-zero-valued eigenvector of H(x) is rψ eφψ , which is strictly positive
I

because rψ > 0 by construction and eφψ > 0. Thus, H(x) is positive semi-definite,
Constraint (82) is convex, and the feasible region defined by the intersection of convex
sets is also convex (Bazaraa et al., 2013).
Resulting from Proposition (2), one can solve the single-level optimization problem P4 and find a global optimum utilizing an interior point method common to any
of a number of alternative, readily-available commercial solvers designed for solving
mixed-integer nonlinear programs for which the integer relaxation is a convex program. The resulting optimal solution to P4 also solves P3, where zP∗ 4 = zP∗ 3 , and from
which the attacker’s solution to P3 can be recovered from the optimal solution to P4
via the optimal dual variable values corresponding to Constraint (82).

4.3

Testing, Results, and Analysis
Before examining the limitations of a commercial solver, Section 4.3.1 tests the

solution method detailed in Section 4.2.2 model for a small, illustrative instance.
Section 4.3.2 details the method used to generate random instances for testing in
Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. Section 4.3.3 reports the results for a realistically-sized
instance, and Section 4.3.4 examines the tractability of a commercial solver to address
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larger instances of the underlying problem, under selective parametric increases in
problem size.
4.3.1

Illustrative Test Instance

Figure 11. Small Illustrative Instance

For an illustrative test instance designed to validate the model and accompanying
solution methodology, we employ a scenario of (U, V, P, λ) = (1, 3, 4, 2), (S) = (3),
and (D, J , I, K, B, L, ) = (2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1). Paths 1-3 correspond to terminal points
v = 1, 2, 3 with rψ values equal to 20, 30, and 40, respectfully. We allow uDd = uIi =
uBb = 1 for all asset types, and set ms = mψ = 2. That is, only one type of each
asset can be placed in total, and at most two interception engagements are allowed
per stage and per path, respectively. Within the set of two detection assets, let the
one having the larger index be the asset with the larger range (e.g., detection asset
2 has a larger range than asset 1). This characteristic also holds for the sets of
two interdiction assets. Figure 11 depicts the locations J , K, and B at which these
assets can be placed. Within this figure, dashed circles represent interdiction asset
ranges, and solid circles represent detection asset ranges. Asset locations, ranges,
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I
BI
and proximity to each path inform the parameters aDdjψs , aBD
blψs , γikψs , and γblψs for the

instance depicted in Figure 11. If a detection resource of type d located at position
j is able to detect path ψ in stage s, then aDdjψs = 1, indicating a detection asset of
type d located at j is able to detect an intruder traversing stage s of path ψ with
a probability equal to one. For example, aD2121 = 1 in the instance in Figure 11.
Additionally, the probabilities of interdiction are set to pIi1ψs = 0.5, pIi2ψs = 0.3, and
pBI
blψs = 0.2. For this illustrative example, λ = 2 so the attacker is forced to choose a
path on which no missile is deployed.
The optimal objective function value for this small instance is equal to 33.1.
Within the unique optimal solution, the defender chooses to locate respective detec∗
= 1).
tion and interdiction assets of type 2 at locations j = 1 and k = 1 (i.e., x∗21 = y21

The defender also chooses to locate its only dual-purpose asset at the only possible
∗
= 1). Alternative locations for detection assets were not
location, l = 1 (i.e., z11

utilized because they would not detect any path. For similar reasons, it is not beneficial to locate an interdiction asset at alternative locations. Given this optimal
solution, the defender is able to shoot twice at stage 2 of both paths 1 and 2 from
I
I
= 2), and to shoot twice at stage 1 of path 3 (i.e.,
= θ2122
location k = 1 (i.e., θ2112
BI
= 2). As a result, the vector of missile interdiction probabilities on paths 1, 2,
θ1131
∗
and 3 is π I = (0.75, 0.75, 0.36). For this problem instance, the attacker’s optimal

solution vector is δ ∗ = (0, 1, 1), indicating decisions to deploy a missile along each of
paths 2 and 3, where the rψ values equal 30 and 40, respectively. In doing so, the
attacker’s missile attack decisions maximize the objective function value in Equation
(57). This illustrative instance validates that model P4 operates as expected and
identifies globally minimizing asset location and assignment decisions for instances of
the underlying problem. In a confirmatory experiment, the same instance was solved
for Problem P3 via the commercial solver BARON, attaining the same result, and
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a visual examination of alternative solutions for Problems P1 and P2 confirm the
optimality of the attained solution.

4.3.2

Test Instance Generation

To test an instance of P4, we first define a “scenario” of P4 to pertain to the set
of 3 user-defined tuples of (U, V, P, λ), (S), and (D, J , I, K, B, L, ). Once a scenario
“size” has been determined by the aforementioned tuple, an instance is defined by
BI
parameterizing the scenario (i.e., generating and assigning values to rψ , uDd , . . . , γblψs
),

dependent on scenario size as an input for some parameters.
For all instances examined herein, the common region in which the defender can
place assets is a rectangular region 2300 units in width and 6400 units in height,
roughly mimicking the expanse of the northern Pacific Ocean. The attacker’s launch
and target regions are rectangular regions 100 units in width and 6400 units in height,
without loss of generality, appended to the respective western and eastern ends of the
region wherein the defender can place assets. The values of rψ are randomly chosen
from a set of 20 values equal to the populations of the largest 20 cities on the North
American West Coast. For example, in the case where |P| = 8, eight numbers are
randomly chosen with replacement from the set of city populations to be used as
rψ -values.
Haywood et al. (2021) detail a formula for generating values for uDd , uIi , and uBb ,
wherein the values are identified from a random uniform distribution having lower
and upper bounds dependent on the number of stages, locations available for asset
placement, and the index of the asset type. We emulate the authors’ convention,
assuming the larger indices correspond to more effective assets (e.g., uD2 has a larger
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detection range than uD1 ). These range formulas are shown in Equations (86)-(89).
6400
S
6400
rangeBD
b = b · U (0, 0.4) ·
S
6400
rangeIi = i · U (0, 0.5) ·
S
6400
rangeBI
b = b · U (0, 0.5) ·
S
rangeDd = d · U (0, 0.5) ·

(86)
(87)
(88)
(89)

We assume that, if a detection or dual-purpose asset is within range of a stage of a
path, the probability of detecting an intruder missile during that stage of the path
is equal to one. However, if an interdiction or dual-purpose asset is within range
of a particular stage of a path, Equations (90) and (91) display the formula used
to determine the probability of interdiction by those assets on the path during that
stage.
i
· U (0.5, 0.9)
I
b
= · U (0.5, 0.9)
B

pIikψs =

(90)

pBI
blψs

(91)

Finally, ms and mψ are generated as functions of the number of stages and paths,
respectively, as seen in Equations (92) and (93).

ms = dU (0.15, 0.25) · Se

(92)

mψ = dU (0.01, 0.1) · Pe

(93)

Using this procedure to develop a random instance for any scenario size of P4, Section
4.3.3 examines the solution to a larger-sized instance of P4, and Section 4.3.4 will
examine the effect of scenario features on the ability of a solver to reach a high-

99

quality solution within a given run-time limit.
4.3.3

Illustration of Relevant Analysis and Insights

Herein, we demonstrate for a larger-sized instance the resulting insights that can
be garnered when the details of an instance are too numerous and varied to enable a
detailed visualization. The specific scenario size examined has features (U, V, P, λ) =
(5, 5, 25, 10), S = 3, and (D, J , I, K, B, L, ) = (5, 10, 5, 10, 5, 10).
Table 24. Solution metrics for a larger-sized instance of P4, sorted in decreasing order
according to expected damage per path

ψ
13
3
23
20
24
16
6
9
11
25
22
18
15
4
21
8
19
1
14
10
17
2
12
7
5

Engagements per stage
Target Value (rψ ) s = 1 s = 2
s=3
4
1
1
1
1.4
1
1
1
1.4
1
1
1
1.4
1
1
1
0.43
1
1
1
0.22
1
1
1
0.88
1
1
1
0.88
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.27
1
1
1
0.23
1
0
1
0.29
1
1
1
0.31
1
1
1
0.22
0
1
1
0.27
1
1
1
0.52
1
1
1
0.38
1
0
1
0.23
1
1
1
0.35
1
1
1
0.28
1
1
1
0.5
1
1
1
0.31
1
1
1
0.23
1
1
1
0.47
1
1
1
0.38
1
1
1

1 − πψI
0.012
0.010
0.008
0.008
0.026
0.045
0.011
0.010
0.007
0.025
0.030
0.021
0.018
0.025
0.020
0.009
0.012
0.018
0.011
0.013
0.006
0.009
0.012
0.005
0.002

Expected Damage
0.049
0.015
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.010
0.010
0.009
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.001

δψ
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 24 depicts selected, relevant solution metrics for a single random instance
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generated with the aforementioned scenario feature levels. The first column contains
the respective indices of 25 paths, the second column displays the randomly generated
target value for each path. The third, fourth, and fifth columns tabulate the number
of defender engagements in each stage due to location decisions regarding detection
and interdiction assets, and the sixth column contains the probability the attacker
successfully navigates each path. The seventh column calculates the expected damage
caused by the intruder by multiplying the values in the second and sixth columns,
and the eighth column reports the attacker’s decision whether to utilize the path.
Table 24 is sorted by the seventh column in decreasing order, and confirms that the
attacker will deploy its 10 missiles along the 10 paths having the highest expected
damage.

4.3.4

Main Testing

The scenario feature levels examined for their effect on the computational effort
required by a leading commercial solver to identify an optimal solution are the number
of each type of asset allowed, the number of locations assets can be placed, the number
of launch and target sites, the total number of stages, and the number of intruder
missiles targeting defender sites. Table 25 depicts the low, medium, and high levels
for each of these scenario features, each of which was identified during preliminary
testing. Due to their similar meaning and to reduce the size of experimental designs
to manageable sizes, testing herein assumes common factor levels for both the number
of possible locations for asset placement (i.e., J = K = L) and the number of asset
types (D = I = B).
Prior to conducting the intended empirical testing, preliminary testing examined
four commercial solvers (i.e., BARON, Bonmin, Couenne, and scip) when solving a set
of 30 randomly generated instances of P4 having medium-sized scenario features, with
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Table 25. Scenario Feature Levels for Instances of P4

Scenario Feature
D=I=B
J =K=L
(U, V)
S
λ

Low
2
5
(3, 5)
2
5

Medium High
5
8
10
15
(5, 5)
(5, 7)
3
4
10
15

the goal of identifying the superlative commercial solver for this problem. Testing was
conducted using the NEOS Server (Gropp and Moré, 1997; Czyzyk et al., 1998; Dolan,
2001), and processed on a Dell PowerEdge R430 with an Intel Xeon E5-2698 processor
and 192 GB of RAM. Each solver was terminated for an instance when either a global
optimal solution was identified (i.e., a 0% relative optimal gap) or the computational
time exceeded 300 seconds. Table 26 reports the number of optimal solutions found
by each solver in the first column, the number of instances not solved to optimality
in the second column, the average absolute optimality gap for the instances in which
suboptimal solutions were reached in the third column, the number of instances in
which the solver failed to return a feasible solution in the fourth column, and the
average run-time for the 30 instances in the fifth column.
Table 26. Solver performance for 30 random instances of P4 with medium-sized scenario
features and run-time limit of 300 seconds

Solver
invoked
BARON
Bonmin
Couenne
scip

No. optimal solns.
20
0
0
27

No. suboptimal solns.
8
0
27
1

Avg. abs. opt.
gap for suboptimal solns.
0.035 ± 0.084
N/A
1.217 ± 1.667
0.001 ± 0.000

No. instances
w/ no feasible
soln. found
2
30
3
2

Avg. comp.
effort (s)
256.627 ± 57.407
300.000 ± 0.000
300.000 ± 0.000
57.600 ± 68.075

Over the 30 instances solved, scip found a feasible solution in 28 instances, 27 of
which were optimal. In the sole instance that scip failed to find the optimal solution,
an extremely small absolute optimality gap of 0.001 was still achieved. BARON
was the second best performer to scip; however, BARON had a longer run-time on
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average and failed to find a feasible solution for two instances. The other two solvers,
while capable and respected in the literature, failed quite often to either identify a
feasible solution or, if a feasible solution was identified, solve the instance to optimality
within the 300-second time limit. Accordingly, subsequent testing invokes scip as the
commercial solver to solve instances of Problem P4.
To determine which scenario features in Table 25 are most influential to the computational effort required by scip to find an optimal solution, a fractional factorial
experiment is conducted. A full factorial design was not chosen due to the prohibitive
size of the experiment requiring 35 = 243 runs to complete. The fractional factorial
experimental design employed is 35−2
III with 30 trials of each run, with the required
computational effort as the response variable. A fractional factorial design is a reasonable design for this research, because the scenario features are the variables of
interest, not the interactions between these variables. The 30 trials at each level are
randomly generated instances using the methodology described in Section 4.3.2. The
solver scip was terminated for an instance when either a global optimal solution was
identified (i.e., a 0% relative optimal gap) or the computational time exceeded 1800
seconds, allowing for the longer times needed to solve instances at runs having high
feature levels. Table 27 reports the results of this experiment to solve 30 randomly
generated instances of P4 at each of 27 different treatment combinations of scenario
feature levels, tabulating the average required computational effort for each run. For
runs wherein scip terminated due to the 30-minute time limit for at least one of the 30
instances, Table 3 also reports the absolute optimality gap attained upon termination.
In 15 out of 27 (56%) of treatment combinations, scip found an optimal solution
for each instance of P4 within the instance’s allotted 30-minute time limit. In the
other 12 treatment combinations, the average absolute optimality gap achieved by
scip was less than or equal to 0.001, indicating that scip identified very high quality
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Table 27. Solver performance for a 35−2
III fractional factorial design with 30 random
instances of P4 at each setting and 1800-second run-time limit

Factors
Req’d Comp.
Abs. Optimality
Run D/I/B J /K/L P S λ
Effort (sec)
Gap Attained*
1
8
15
35 4 15
0.294 ± 0.176
–
2
2
5
15 2 5
5.232 ± 3.527
–
3
2
10
35 2 15
8.685 ± 5.940
–
4
2
15
25 2 10
11.313 ± 7.736
–
5
5
5
35 2 10
27.728 ± 13.788
–
6
5
10
25 2 5
15.015 ± 5.113
–
7
5
15
15 2 15
12.676 ± 5.609
–
8
8
5
25 2 15
28.232 ± 13.096
–
9
8
10
15 2 10 1,238.189 ± 513.792
0.001 ± 0.003
10
8
15
35 2 5
0.814 ± 0.646
–
11
2
5
25 3 5
1.910 ± 1.583
0.000 ± 0.000
12
2
10
15 3 15
87.584 ± 112.629
–
13
2
15
35 3 10
3.149 ± 2.216
0.000 ± 0.000
14
5
5
15 3 10 348.490 ± 437.747
0.000 ± 0.000
15
5
10
35 3 5
819.954 ± 683.335
0.000 ± 0.000
16
5
15
25 3 15 258.860 ± 320.917
0.000 ± 0.000
17
8
5
35 3 15 960.703 ± 646.639
0.000 ± 0.000
18
8
10
25 3 10 838.435 ± 726.696
0.000 ± 0.000
19
8
15
15 3 5
0.526 ± 0.421
–
20
2
5
35 4 5
1.898 ± 2.068
–
21
2
10
25 4 15
2.124 ± 1.703
0.000 ± 0.000
22
2
15
15 4 10
1.130 ± 0.663
–
23
5
5
25 4 10
3.957 ± 3.513
–
24
5
10
15 4 5
276.019 ± 455.152
0.000 ± 0.000
25
5
15
35 4 15
0.822 ± 0.514
0.000 ± 0.000
26
8
5
15 4 15
97.116 ± 142.193
–
27
8
10
35 4 10 192.375 ± 333.794
0.000 ± 0.000
*An entry of ‘–’ indicates scip identified a global optimal solution
for all 30 instances of a factor-level run for problem P4
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solutions even in the instances wherein a global optimal solution was not positively
identified.
For the required computational effort response, a simple linear regression (SLR)
model is computed to further observe the effects of each scenario feature level on the
response. Table 28 presents the coefficient estimates for SLR model using the data
presented in Table 27.
Table 28. Standard Least Squares Regression Coefficient Estimates for Required Computational Effort (seconds)

Term
D/I/B
J /K/L
P
S
λ

Estimate
65.154
35.431
7.941
-42.855
-13.982

Std Error
5.467
3.280
1.640
16.402
3.280

t Ratio
11.920
10.800
4.840
-2.610
-4.260

Prob> |t|
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0091
<.0001

For a significance level of α = 0.05, the fifth column in Table 28 indicates that
each of the scenario feature levels is significant for predicting the computational effort
required by scip when solving instances of P4. The second column presents an interesting result: the number of types of assets, locations at which to place assets, and
paths available for the intruder to employ correlate positively with the amount of time
required by scip to obtain optimal solutions. This result comports with conventional
wisdom; having more options for a problem instance requires greater computational
effort to identify an optimal solution. The number of stages over which the attacker
may be detected and interdicted by the defender’s assets and the number of intruder
missiles the intruder uses correlate negatively with the response, indicating that more
stages and/or intruder missiles result in a lesser amount of time required for scip to
obtain optimal solutions for instances of P4. Collectively, these results indicate that
solving instances of P4 having more locations for assets and asset types may induce
computational challenges, but those challenges may be offset with an artificial par-
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titioning of paths into a greater number of stages, should it be acceptable from a
modeling perspective for the application of interest.

4.4

Conclusions
Given three respective sets of detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resources,

each having different types of resources with heterogenous capabilities, this research
develops a mathematical programming model to effectively defend a set of population
centers against attack by a limited number of ICBMs by locating sets of BMD resources to detect and interdict ICBMs over a range of launch-to-target missile paths.
These paths, and their respective, spatio-temporally defined flight stages, are employed under the assumption the adversary will observe the asset locations and respond with a ICBM targeting strategy that maximizes the expected damage of an
attack. We set forth a mixed-integer nonlinear program (MINLP) and develop subsequent models to linearize and reformulate the model to a single-objective mixedinteger linear program (MILP), referred to as P4.
After defining P4, we examine a small, illustrative instance of P4 to ensure that
the model provides the expected optimal solution. We subsequently examine a largersized instance of P4 to demonstrate the readily discernible insights from an optimal
solution for an instance that is too large and complex to analyze by inspection. The
larger-sized instance of P4 confirms that the attacker will attack paths with the highest expected damage inflicted upon defender targets, implying that P4 has potential
for use in much larger-sized instances.
After defining scenario features, this work details a method to parameterize instances of P4 in a manner dependent on scenario feature levels. For low, medium,
and high scenario feature levels, testing compares four leading commercial solvers on
their performance in obtaining solutions for 30 instances having medium-level sce-
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nario features. The solver scip prevailed as the most consistent solver at finding high
quality solutions and also in a timely manner, and was used as the solver for testing
afterwards.
A fractional factorial design tested scip’s ability to obtain optimal solutions in
a given time limit for various scenario sizes. Using this data, an SLS regression
model informed an examination of which scenario features are most significant in
predicting the amount of time required by scip to obtain an optimal solution. All five
scenario features examined are significant; three of the features correlate positively
with the computational effort required, and the other two correspond negatively.
Results identify the problem features that will induce computational challenges, even
when solving the MINLP with the superlatively performing commercial solver.
Future research should examine the underlying problem in a similar game-theoretic
context, with the caveat that the defender has incomplete information about the attacker’s capabilities. Such an extension may identify asset location solutions that
are suboptimal to the model formulated herein, but robust to missing or incorrect
information about an adversary. An additional extension of merit would be to consider an attacker having different missile types with heterogenous capabilities and
susceptibilities to interdiction.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This dissertation considers the problem of an intruder attempting to traverse a defender’s territory, divided into distinct stages either spatially, temporally, or both, and
wherein the defender aims to locate and employ disparate sets of resources to lower
the probability of a successful intrusion. Various optimization techniques are used to
model the problem, including mixed-integer nonlinear programming, multi-objective
optimization, bilevel programming, and mixed-integer linear programming. Additionally, multiple solution techniques are examined such as leading commercial solvers for
global optimization and multiple-objective optimization genetic algorithms. In addition to the models developed, many differently-sized test instances of the underlying
problem are generated and solved to test the efficacy and efficiency of the respective
solution methodologies. The research presented in this dissertation is of interest to
planners in scenarios like the ballistic missile defense enterprise, wherein multiple
resources are located and employed to minimize the expected damage inflicted by
intruder missiles.

5.1

Conclusions
Given two respective sets of detection resources and interdiction resources, each

having different types of resources with heterogeneous capabilities, Chapter II addresses the problem of locating and allocating them over a sequence of spatiallydefined stages to effectively detect and intercept an intruder. A mixed-integer nonlinear program, and several variants, are constructed to address the underlying problem
using a leading commercial solver for global optimization. Analysis identifies which
factors in the Resource Allocation for Intruder Detection and Interdiction (RAIDI)
scenarios influence the solution quality found by the model variants. Testing results
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identified that the number of types of detection and interdiction resources are the
significant factors in determining the relative optimality gap obtained by the model
variants, and that every feature level is a significant factor in determining the computational effort required to solve an instance of a RAIDI scenario. The superlative
RAIDI model variant identified via two phases of empirical testing is the default-b
model, which augments the default model with simple upper and lower bounds on
each of the probability calculations to enhance the performance of the commercial
solver’s branch-and-bound procedure.
The research presented in Chapter II makes three contributions to the literature.
First, it sets forth a baseline mathematical programming model – and seven alternative variants – to address the underlying problem of allocating limited resources for
the detection and interdiction of an intruder. Second, it conducts empirical testing
to evaluate and compare the effect of alternative model variants on the efficacy and
efficiency of a leading commercial solver to identify optimal solutions. Third, it rigorously examines the impact of selected problem features on the ability of a leading
commercial solver to address larger instances of the underlying problem, portending
its utility for larger applications.
Given an intruder attempting to traverse a spatially-decomposed region via multiple possible paths, Chapter III aims to effectively and cost-efficiently identify a
defensive strategy that locates sets of detection resources and interdiction resources,
each of which has different types of resources that vary by cost and capability. In comparing different solution methodologies, limitations for identifying a global optimal
solution via a leading commercial solver (BARON) were identified during computational testing, which motivated the exploration of metaheuristics as a valid solution
method. For the two multi-objective GAs chosen, RWGA and NSGA-II, each of
which was selected based on different conceptual performance characteristics, empir-
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ical testing demonstrated their superior performance in comparison with BARON,
with respect to the both the quantity of non-dominated solutions identified (individually or relative to all methods tested) and the required computational effort to do
so.
Within the context of the related literature, this research presented in Chapter III
makes two contributions. In its first contribution to address the underlying problem,
this research sets forth a mathematical programming model having several collectively complicating aspects that differentiate it from other research in the literature,
as reviewed in Section 3.1.1. The model addresses the location of assets across an enterprise comprised of different asset types (i.e., detection and interdiction assets) and
capabilities, including dual-purpose assets representing actual assets for certain motivating scenarios (e.g., AEGIS class destroyers in a BMD scenario). The enterprise
approach of the model considers the location of these assets in a defender’s territory
organized into multiple stages, better representing the geographic boundaries often
used to organize defenses for related applications (e.g., border patrol). Finally, the
model employs a multi-objective approach to enable the examination of the tradeoffs
between the effectiveness and cost of defensive asset configurations. In its second
contribution, this research identifies and empirically tests alternative, conceptually
sound solution methodologies for instances of the underlying problem. Empirical
testing first identifies the instance size-specific limitations of a leading commercial,
global optimization solver, motivating the examination of metaheuristics. Subsequent
testing compares the relative efficacy of two metaheuristics for solving larger-sized instances, identifying the superlative technique that provides practical utility to the
relevant mathematical programming model presented in the first contribution.
Given three respective sets of detection, interdiction, and dual-purpose resources,
each having different types of resources with heterogenous capabilities, Chapter IV
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develops a mathematical programming model to effectively defend a set of population
centers against attack by a limited number of ICBMs by locating sets of BMD resources to detect and interdict ICBMs over a range of launch-to-target missile paths.
These paths and their respective, spatio-temporally defined flight stages, are employed
under the assumption the adversary will observe the asset locations and respond with
a ICBM targeting strategy that maximizes the expected damage of an attack. We set
forth a mixed-integer nonlinear program (MINLP), and develop subsequent models
to linearize and reformulate the model to a single-objective mixed-integer linear program (MILP), referred to as P4. P4 is validated using a small, illustrative instance
and subsequently tested on an instance too large and complex to analyze by inspection which confirms that the attacker will act as expected by attacking paths with
the highest expected damage inflicted upon defender targets. Subsequent analysis
uses a fractional factorial design, which determined that every scenario feature for instances of P4 are significant in predicting the amount of time the solver (scip) needs
to obtain an optimal solution and that certain scenario features induce significant
computational challenges.
Within the context of the related literature, the research in Chapter IV makes
three contributions. First, IV sets forth a game theoretic, bilevel program modeling
framework for the problem of allocating missile defense resources to detect and interdict intruder ballistic missiles attempting to destroy valuable targets. Second, it
applies a series of transformations that reformulate the model as a single-level mathematical program that is shown to be convex and, hence, readily solvable to optimality
by any of a number of commercial optimization solvers. Third, the research conducts
testing to both illustrate its efficacy and empirically examine its practical tractability, both of which are sound for application on large-scale instances of the underlying
problem.
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5.2

Recommendations
Future research may examine a similar problem to those studied in Chapters II-IV,

albeit having certain differences not considered herein due to anticipated tractability
issues. Although these issues could be insurmountable, only a deliberate effort will
identify the challenges in detail and, perhaps, overcome them.
One possible avenue to explore is the removal of the assumed independence between probability of detection and interdiction within a stage. Although revisiting
this assumption is not helpful to the defender in terms of efficiently identifying a
solution, it may lend more fidelity to the underlying problem. However, removing
this assumption leads to various modeling issues that are not simple to remedy, and
it will almost certainly require the design and use of a metaheuristic to find solutions
in a reasonable amount of time.
Another problem worthy of exploration is the situation wherein an intruder has
incomplete information. For example, if the intruder cannot observe the defender’s
location decisions with 100% accuracy (and the defender is aware of this shortcoming),
how might the resulting solutions change? A similar problem may arise if the defender
is given incomplete information about the intruder’s options regarding an attack (e.g.,
unknown number of paths or attacker target values).
Finally, future research may also examine adding more objectives to a problem
similar to the one observed in Chapter IV. Multi-objective optimization in combination with a bilevel programming formulation may yield an interesting study, particularly when examining potential solution methods. Chapter III portends the use
of multi-objective genetic algorithms as a potential solution method for instances
of the underlying problem, and its contributions may prove useful in this research
extension.
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